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It starts
as a murmur
from one mouth to another
in a rhythm of ribaldry
that rises to a crescendo
'Alelungu ngo'dam
Basibiza ngo Jim
Whites are damned
they call us Jim*

Cswald MtshalirThe Roadgang's Cry

Cry, the beloved country, these things are not yet at an
end.

The sun pours down on the earth, on the lovely land

that man cai

t enjoy.

He knows only the fear of his heart.

Alan Paton:Cry The Beloved Country

V'e do not want South Africa to be poor; but we do not desire
any continuance of the system whereby our labour and foreign
capital keep tne present state of affairs indefinitely in
existence.

Albert LuthulirLet Wy People Go

Our fathers hac. their dreams: we have ours: the generation
that i'ollcvvo will Lavi its own. 7,'ithout dreetis and phantoms
Tc':. cannot exist.

Olive Schreiner:The Story of an
African Farm
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PREFACE

Development geography has traditionally concerned
itself with describing regional economic disparities in a
country and seeking normative remedies for the problem of
uneven •development*.

Rarely was the problem perceived of

as an historical process, or as a process which transcends
national limits, or as an outcome of ideologically-based
strategies.

That is, development geographers ignored the

structures of which underdevelopment is but a part. A
departure from this orthodox type of approach is made here.

As an exercise in renovated development geography,
this dissertation is by definition historico-political in
nature.

The notion of development may be equated, essen-

tially, with progress toward a set of goals inherent in
the ideology1 of a group or class of people. Oversimplified as this definition may be, it does help to explain
why the development of the nation - national development is often an arduous process whereby conflicting sub-national social groups pursue varying means toward different
Utopias.

History is replete with the consequences of

ideologically-based conflicts, and South Africa has not
been spared.

In that country, the search for happiness

and security by a politically and economically dominant
group has been unsuccessful, for that search has been at
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the cost of unhappiness and insecurity among those excluded
from the superordinate group.

This study is concerned with

aspects of the spatial impress of polity and economy in
South Africa; or, put another way, it is concerned with the
spatial expression of ideologies of the dominant group.

South Africa's population is categorised by its
rulers into a number of groups on the basis of racial or
ethnic differentiation.

The economically and politically

dominant group comprises whites (4.l6million in number in
1974 ), and it is at the hand of members of this group that
segregation according to this categorisation is enforced.
The numerically dominant group (numbering 17.75million in
1974) is composed of Africans (blacks), exclusive of Coloureds (2.31million in 1974), Indians (0.71million in 1974),
and other numerically less significant groups.

Africans, or blacks, are, in the dissertation, conceived of as constituting an internal colony within South
Africa.

Members of the African group, who are synonymously

referred to as blacks in the dissertation, have been designated in the past as Natives and, in the nomenclature of
today's rulers, as Bantu.

Similarly, the locations and

reserves of yesteryear, to which blacks have been relegated
to varying degrees and under changing conditions, have
undergone transformation in official notation.

The terms

location and reserve have been replaced by the term 'home-
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land'3.

The latter concept complies with the development

of apartheid^", the ideology and practice of post-1943 segregation under the direction of the ruling National Party.
In this study the terms Native, Bantu, and location are
used only when contained in an official title (e.g. the
name of a government department), or in quoted passages.

KwaZulu is the name attached to a complex of former r^erves now constituting a 'homeland* which is situated
jr> the South African province of Natal (see Map No. 1).

Besides introducing the objectives of the study
and the research approach adopted, Chapter One also briefly
sets KwaZulu in historical and spatial perspective.

There-

after, Chapter Two elaborates on the conceptual framework
for the dissertation (i.e. internal colonialism) and
attempts to illustrate the comparative applicability of
different models for analysing the South African economy
<md society in their spatial and temporal dimensicnr.
The third chapter returns to KwaZulu and attempts an
analysis of KwaZulu*s historical origins up to 1972.
Whereas Chanter Three represents an outline of developments
over more than one hundred years, the analysis is more
detailed in Chapter Four where attention is concentrated
on the years 1972 to 1975.

It has besn these years during

which government has announced its partial consolidation
plans for FwaZulu.

Chapter Five specifies selected major
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implications of the government*s consolidation proposals.
Finally, Chapter Six endeavours, as a synthesis of the
study, to formulate some important questions about the
future of development and underdevelopment in the Republic
of South Africa. A number of maps, including one showing
a selection of place names in Natal, are appended to
the text and may interest the reader unfamiliar with
Natal (Appendix A ) ,
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction
The objectives and scope of the research project
are defined in this chapter (1.2).

A section briefing the

historical geographical base of KwaZulu follows (1.3).
Finally, the data sources and methods for the research are
outlined (1.4) and the research intentions summarised (1.5).

1.2 Objectives and Scope
Despite the implementation of apartheid being fundamentally a spatial exercise, its implications have received limited attention in geographical literature(Smith,
1976), and there is a dearth of geographical work on the
role of the state and of capital in moulding the South African space economy through its evolution.

Remarkable too

is the apparent disregard in the geographical literature
for theories of colonialism and underdevelopment, currently
applied in other social sciences, which might assist the
geographer to comprehend the contemporary spatial pattern
in South Africa, particularly in terms of its genesis.

The problem at hand, therefore, is a manifold one
of conceptualisation and of establishing the empirical
association between discernable economic and social forces
in South Africa and the territorial makeup of KwaZulu.
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The aim of this dissertation is to analyse the
creation and manipulation of the territorial base of KwaZulu, with primary focus upon recent attempts by South
Africa*s government partially to consolidate KwaZulu into
ten non-contiguous segments.

This action is explored with

special attention being paid to the manner in which KwaZulu was arranged as a response to white economic and political interests and aspirations; to the part played by
blacks in the establishment and sanctioning of the partial
consolidation schemes; and, to the way in which the schemes
promote or hinder peaceful change toward a system wherein
the fruits of South Africa*s labour and material resources
are equitably distributed.

Conceptual foundations for the study originate
from theories of colonialism and development and underdevelopment, and are assembled and presented within the
internal colonialism model (discussed in detail in Chapter
Two).

1-3 KwaZulu in Brief
The territorially dismembered KwaZulu 'homeland*
is encapsulated by Natal (see Map No.2).

Natal Province

was administered as a colony by Britain 1345 until 1910
(Zululand was annexed to Natal in 1397), when it became
one of the four provinces in the Union of South Africa .
Under British colonial administration and during the rule

3

SWAZILAND

r>%fe

I

\

•Dundee 1

•Ladysmith*

1

;hards Bay

•<_ e y t o v

LESOTHO

N
8dole

jrbon

50
i_

Kilometre6

MAP 2 .

KwaZulu: December 1971

100
1

4

of Union government various legislative acts laid the foundations for a system of reserving land for exclusive settlement by indigenous blacks within Natal and facilitated the
territorial fragmentation of Zululand (see 3.3).

After 1943, when the current regime came to power,
an ideology of apartheid (later termed *separate development* by proponents of the ideology) moved government to
work toward maintaining the system of reserves with a view
eventually to giving these areas political independence
from South Africa.

Government clustered the original

reserves in South Africa into ten fragmented complexes,
which it called 'homelands*, and allocated them to various
tribal groupings (or *national units*) in the country.
The end result of apartheid policy, then, would be a *white*
South Africa containing a number of politically independent
*black* states, of which a dissected KwaZulu would be one.
Success thus far, from the apartheid perspective, may be
measured in Transkei*s attainment of political independence
on 26

October, 1976 and indications that another 'home-

land*, Bophuthatswana, will acquire that status in December,
1977.

At present, KwaZulu consists of forty eight blocks
of land and over one hundred smaller tracts ('black spots* ),
amounting to 3,155,OOOha and carrying in 1970 a de facto/
population of approximately 4,0l3,000(Maasdorp, 1974).
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Official policy would have it that all six million people
classified by government as Zulu ultimately become citizens
of an independent state of KwaZulu.

Government has, during the last four years, proposed
plans to consolidate KwaZulu into ten segments.

Such action

demands large-scale resettlement of blacks, mostly from one
rural area to another, and the granting of fiscal compensations to the relatively few whites whose land is delimited now as KwaZulu territory, and who are expected to migrate
to *white* territory.

While Black response to the implementation of apartheid has not been insignificant, government has proceeded
apace in pursuance of its segregationist goals. Reaction
from blacks has come as outright refusals to co-operate
with the white government, in the form of violence; it has
come in the form of worker strikes against conditions symptomatic of a discriminatory labour policy; and it has come
in a form legitimised* by government, from those operating
the government-designed KwaZulu Legislative Assembly.
Black politicians are utilising the consolidation issue to
parry government's attempts to give KwaZulu political independence, and their approach as well as the other voices
of black opposition command some attention in the dissertation.
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1.4 Data and Methodology
The data analysed in this study are largely empirical or empirically-based and were collected from primary and
secondary sources in South Africa.

Although most of the

information was gathered during research in various libraries in Natal^ , information was also sought by correspondence with relevant officials and other individuals and
organisations.

Primary material comprising descriptive and quantitative data was found In colonial and post-colonial Blue
Books on Native Affairs, in census and other official statistical reports, and in Hansard reports on Parliamentary
proceedings.

Primary material reflecting official attitudes

was derived from Hansard and from reports of officials to
government, either in the form found in Blue Books or such
as is found in official correspondence and in the reports
of government-initiated commissions of inquiry.

The latter

reports contain also evidence submitted by witnesses to the
commissions.

Secondary sources, including both published works
and unpublished theses, provided much in the way of quantitative data, as well as assisting in the framing of the
historical perspective of the dissertation.

Information pertaining to the post-1970 consolida-
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tion issue and other recent developments originates mainly
from Natalian press reports, other pertinent documents
(especially critiques of the consolidation proposals), and
personal observation.

Hatal in its economic, social, political, and territorial dimensions is the structure, the composition of
which is of interest here.

Stating parameters as such is

not to deny that the components mentioned belong also to
a larger structure, the South African political-space economy, say; or that that larger structure is nested within
other structures of economy and society, of development
and underdevelopment, and so on.

An exposition of the

relationships within and among these structures is later
seen to be fundamental to an explanation of international
patterns of development and underdevelopment.

The relationships

under scrutiny in the ensuing

chapters are those between white owners of land (i.e. capital)
and the state, between those landowners and the land, and
between black occupants of the land and each of the other
three elements.

Depth is sought in the level of reality exemplified
by ideology.

Ideology is taken to mean the body of ideas

commonly shared by a social group or social class, and
whereby group or class interests are rationalised.

Insight

8

into the ideologies of landowners, of government, and of
blacks, respectively, is vital to an understanding of the
dynamics of the South African space economy, for these
ideologies represent bonds of cohesion and motivation for
group action.

1.5 Summary of Intentions
This study:
1)Examines the roles of government, white landowners, and
blacks in creating, delimiting, and altering KwaZulu
over time.
2)Outlines government's partial consolidation proposals
for KwaZulu and analyses the roles of the abovementioned
actors in formulating, defending, and opposing these
proposals.
3)Posits some potential major problems arising from the
consolidation proposals.
4)0ffers, through synthesis, a contribution toward the
development of the geography of development and underdevelopment, particularly as it relates to South Africa.
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CHAPTER TWO
CONCEPTUAL OUTLINE

2.1 Introduction
An analytical framework for the dissertation is
erected in this chapter.

Firstly, the bearing of ideology

on the geography of development is discussed (2.2).

There-

after, the concepts of development, underdevelopment, colonialism, and dependence are considered (2.3) and this
provides a springboard for the building of a model of internal colonialism through extrapolation from these concepts
and from the work of Hechter(1975) (2.4).

The model is

contrasted with others (2.5), and a summary statement of
its applicability to South African socio-economic structures
is presented (2.6).

2.2 Ideology and Development Geography
A growing awareness of the negative repercussions
of development and the impress of historical factors in
underdeveloped regions has been accompanied by an abundance
of publications reflecting changing theoretical and analytical tendencies in the social sciences. Within geography,
the last five years have seen the emergence and growth of
a school of thought founded during the 'social relevance'
era of the early seventies and having now as frames of
reference generally socialistic texts, often with a Marxist
or neo-Marxist bent.

10

As noted by Santos(1974), a reliance on Marx is not
a novelty in broader geographic traditions.

However, the

trend noted is certainly an innovation among Anglophone
geographers.

Santos(1974) also calls attention to the

degree to which Marx provides a pertinent source for geographers, especially those concerned with underdevelopment.
Following Santos'(1974) line of questioning, discussion in
this section revolves around the contents of selected recent
publications and seeks to clarify the relationships between
ideology and analytical concepts in geographical studies of
development and underdevelopment.

A number of geographers have been striving, since
about 1973, to inform their confreres about the presence
of ideologies which shape geographic research methodologies.
They have suggested, furthermore, that geographers should
change their ideological stances since the results of their
research perpetuates the status QUO: a societal condition
(viz. capitalism) not conducive, it is argued, to social
equity or egalitarianism.

Examples of such ideas are found

in articles by Anderson(1973), Slater(1973), Blaut(1974),
Harvey(1974), and Olsson(1974).

Blaut(1974) makes the

point that while the values of many geographers in capitalist countries are rooted in an agreeable conception of the
need for change to achieve social justice, their methodologies and thus research results are inappropriate contributions toward this goal. Attention may also be drawn to
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the fact that much research is constrained by the Elites of
society who, directly or indirectly, finance and utilise
social research and its results.

Ideological transformations have altered the direction of development geography, and the changing emphasis
within this branch of the discipline is considered firstly
by reference to a critique of orthodox development geography by Slater(1973)•

The contributions of de Souza and

Porter(1974), Brookfield(1975), and Santos(1974;1975) are
then introduced as representatives of the van in a changing
paradigm for development geography.

Slater(1973) cogently illustrates the weaknesses
inherent in the three modes of analysis widely applied by
development geographers.

He links the three modes - spatial

differentiation (duality and centre-periphery models);
spatial diffusion (modernization theory); and spatial integration (models of national integration) - to a distinct
ideology and argues that the ideology must be changed if
sound theories of development and underdevelopment are to
be established.

Slater(1973) posits the opinion that the

weak theoretical base of orthodox development geography
may be traced to '...the capitalist ideology that
conditions the choice of the problem, the
type of data collected, the method of analysis employed, and the identification of conclusions for planning' (Slater,1973). The remedy for
this crisis, he maintains, is '...not just a
reformist readjustment of some of the most
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distorted tenets of capitalist ideology, but
a total abolition of the ideology itself and
the development of a Marxist-orientated geography, which...goes to the historical roots
of underdevelopment as manifested at all spatial levels, incorporating explanations of
internal spatial structures of underdevelopment into the framework of the political
economy of imperialism' (Slater,1973).

The views expressed by Slater(1973) are relatively
new in the geographical literature but reflect ideas expounded for some years in other social sciences. Frank
(1967;1969;1972), for example, has dealt with underdevelopment as a process concomitant with colonialism and capitalism.

His works have been widely read and have received not

a little criticism from economists and sociologists (see,
e.g., the critiques in Oxaal,Barnett,and Booth,1975).
Emmanuel(1972) also has recently supplemented his treatise
on the distribution of capital and the unequal exchange of
capital with labour on a global scale.

In a recent article

he reiterates the necessity of studying underdevelopment as
a phenomenon related with development in other parts of the
world, i.e. underdevelopment is seen to be a function of
the development of international capitalism (Emmanuel,1974).

de Souza and Porter(1974) propound a dialectical
geography and cite Harvey(1973) as the protagonist of this
approach in geography. While their book has some appeal
as a review of an extensive range of literature on development, underdevelopment, and modernization, the authors fail
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to distinguish clearly between modernization and development (a common failing among orthodox geographers).

An

early contribution to a changing paradigm in geography, the
work is, as stated in its preface, only a 'starting point',
and provides, as such, little insight into the current state
of development geography.

Brookfield(1975), after a more thorough and more
extensive review of geographical and non-geographical literature than de Souza and Porter(1974), profers the foundations for a theory of interdependent development. While
accepting socialistic conceptions of imperialism, colonialism, and capitalism, and dubbing himself a neo-Marxist,
Brookfield(1975) proceeds to state his disenchantment with
the prospect of a purely Marxist geography.

Besides his

rejection of the authority of Marx, Brookfield(1975) also
demonstrates non-acceptance of the Marxist image of class
struggle.

For his treatment of the notion of dependence,

his work will be of interest to development geographers,
although this does not necessarily imply their acceptance
of his interpretation of global patterns of development
and underdevelopment.

He mentions the dependence of devel-

oped states on underdeveloped states and vice-versa, and
tends thus to intensify the propagation of the concept of
interdependent development.

(This concept is dealt with

again in the next section, 2.3.)

14

Santos(1974;1975) is cautious in his treatment of
Marxism as a potential foundation for the study of underdevelopment and his apparent effort at vindicating Harvey
(1973) is 8 demonstration of his dissociation from a dogmatic Marxism.

He recognises in Harvey*s(1973) work a

Marxist methodology but, it can be inferred, does not regard
Harvey(1973) as a 'pure* Marxist : *It is fortunate that
D.Harvey is speaking of a method and not a doctrine' (Santos, 1975).

Santos(1975) is prepared to accept Marxist

concepts but not unconditionally so; hence the caveat
•It is by studying the very notion of historic time, which is basic to the Marxist
method, that one can understand why some of
Marx's interpretations have become inadequate;
the method therefore remains necessary. But
it is important to avoid the snare of temporal myopia...' (Santos,1975). Finally, in Santos'
(1975) paper a global approach to the problem of underdevelopment through domination is discerned, along with his
rejection of 'pure* Marxism for geography : 'The
facts, universally acknowledged to be true
for our time, are the following : an increased
need to accumulate capital, attended by its
concentration and the necessity for its circulation on a world-wide scale; the control
of production and consumption by multi-national firms at the international level, through
monopoly, research and all-powerful advertising.
These new conditions, dating from after the
second World War, invalidate any study which,
taking Marx as its authority, seeks to reinterpret his ideas without taking account of
the renewal of historical categories' (Santos,1975).

Regardless of discord on certain conceptual issues,
the combined appeal of Slater(1973), Brookfield(1975), and
Santos(1974;1975), is for a geography of development and

15

underdevelopment freed from capitalist ideology.

Perhaps

the paramount feature then of the changed paradigm in development geography is that it has exposed the import of ideology in studies of the spatial consequences of any given
socio-economic structure.

Theory rooted in capitalist ideo-

logy evades the realities of the development of capitalism.
The occurrence of underdevelopment in societies linked into
the international capitalist economy is not recognised in
orthodox development geography as an offshoot of the development of capitalism.

It follows that the theories of

orthodox development geography have tended to advocate
'development* in underdeveloped regions by the very means
which originally gave rise to regional economic and social
disparities.

2.3 Colonialism. Dependence, and Underdevelopment
The ideologies which have spawned the nascent paradigm in development geography have, besides revealing the
strictures of orthodox development geography, introduced
also to the discipline concepts which have hitherto been
either eschewed or simply taken for granted.

Particular

emphasis is devoted in the present section to the concepts
of colonialism, dependence, and underdevelopment.

Colonialism has received some, albeit scant, analytically critical attention from geographers.

Robequain

(1941) dealt with problems of colonialism in the Netherlands
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East Indies.

The first of his two papers threw light on the

types of European colonisation; the second dealt with the
indigenous economy of the Netherlands East Indies. Characteristic of colonialism was the concentration of European
capital in enormous land tracts which changed hands among
anonymous companies (*societes anonymes*) by means of transactions in the stock exchanges of Amsterdam, London, New
York, and Paris.

Citing evidence from 1937, Robequain(1941)

detailed how, in Java, almost a half million ha. of
privately owned land was in the hands of 119 proprietors.

Five years later, the same author, in a more farreaching study, asserted that *Security on the seas
and penetration into new countries were twin
designs dictated to the Western nations by
their hunger for raw materials to feed their
industries and supply the demands of the
swarms of workers* (Robequain,1946:320). The fulfilment of these aims was provided by the Malay world of the
East Indies.

Robequain(1946) aside, very few geographers endeavoured to explain the spatial processes of colonialism in
any great depth until the 1970*s when the search for
*relevance», social justice, and new theory encouraged
analyses of the determinants of spatial inequities at all
levels in society.

An early work accompanying this new

wave of interest was Brcokfield*s Colonialism. Development
and Dependence (1972) .
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Brookfield(1972) writes of colonialism as '...a
thoroughgoing, comprehensive and deliberate
penetration of a local or "residentiary"
system by the agents of an external system,
who aim to restructure the patterns of
organisation, resource use, circulation
and outlook so as to bring these into a
linked relationship with their own system* (Brookfield,
1972:1 ff).

He remarks on the value of separating the

economic, political, and cultural forces stimulated by the
*agents of the external system* and also enunciates an
early critique of diffusionist theories of development,
which neglect the potential negative repercussions of these
forces.

Brookfield(1972) suggests that modernizatlor is s

phase following in the wake of imperialism which ^ay not
auger well for development in a politically independent
ex-colony.

These contributions by geographers notwithstanding,
conceptual clarification is sought in this otudy outside
of the discipline and recourse is made to works emanating
from disciplines which have, until now, experienced closed
familiarity with colonialism, dependence, underdevelopment,
and internal colonialism.

Empire-building by the states of western Europe
involved an expansion of political and economic authority
and control over territories spatially separated from the
metropolitan seat of empire.

A plethora of meanings is

attached to the concept of imperialism, the force which
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germinated colonialism, and the scope of this study precludes
a review of literature surrounding the tern-', what is of
concern here is the theory of colonialism, which relates
to thfc structures embodied in and sustaining the colony.
Whereas a theory of imperialism would represent a form of
explanation of the ideologies inspiring colonialism and the
concomitant economic stimulus for territorial expansionism,
a theory of colonialism encompasses an exposition of ideologies and manifestations thereof particularly within the
colony.

Of course, the relationship between metropc]e and

colony may not be ignored for it is vital to an understanding of the evolution, transformation, or demise of colonialism.

Of im erialism then, suffice it to state, following

Barratt-Brown(^974), that *At all times the concept
of imperialism has been used to encompass the
outward drive of certain peoples...to build
empires - both formal colonies and privileged
positions in markets, protected sources of
materials and extended opportunities for
profitable employment of labour* (Barratt-Brown,1974:
22).

Brett(1973) furnishes a lucid statement on the
nature of colonialism and underdevelopment and their interrelationship.

Colonialism, contends Brett(1973), can be

traced to ideologies within the metropolitan country and in
the colony, and he offers an analysis of the social, economic, and political structures of colonialism, relating them
to the ideologies of one colonial ruling class„
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Brett(1973) endorses the view that 'Capitalism had
evolved organically in the areas of origin, but it was
injected into the colonial world from the outside...* (Brett,
1973:°34).

The ideological impulse for this injection came

from a colonial ruling class, whose values embodied the
assumptions that '...the colonized peoples were
not capable of governing themselves "under
the strenuous conditions cf the modern world",
and that the relationship between the interests
of colonized and colonizer was an essentially
reciprocal and creative rather than an exploitative and contradictory one' (Brett,1973:41).

Capitalism was introduced into the colonies under
political and economic conditions specific to each colony.
This differential form of evolution of Eritish colonies
arose from *. .the ideological presuppositions
introduced into...(each)...situation by the
new governing class, and those originating
in the exigencies of the local social situation which they had to bring under their
own control* (Brett,1973:43)• Ultimately, however,
colonialism relied on the continuing economic and political
subjugation of the colonised.

Institutionalisation tc

maintain this state of affairs restricted political representation of the colonised and encouraged pre-colonial
modes of production among the colonised.

The objective

usually was to assure cheap labour for settler agriculture
and industry, thus further entrenching expatriate power
within the colony as well as motivating further capital
investment from the metropolitan country.
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Colonialism, in its political dimension at least,
has not persisted and while many of its spatial characteristics have been retained in various independent states no
longer under colonial administration, certain of its oth-r
inherent structures have left the ex-colonies in a state of
dependence vis-a-vis some exogenous power.

Brett(1973)

outlines the connection between the legacy of colonialism,
dependence, development, and underdevelopment in a number
of succint definitions. Development, for him, denotes
*...a change process characterized by
increased productivity, equalization in the
distribution of the social product, and the
emergence of indigenous institutions whose
relations with the outside world...are
characterized by equality rather than by
dependence or subordination* (Brett,1973:-3). Conversely, underdevelopment denotes '...a condition of
dependence - one in which the activities of
a given society are subjected to the overriding control of an exterr.al power over
which it can exert little direct influence* (Brett,
1973-13). Finally, *Colonialism can be accused
of "the development of underdevelopment" if
it can be shown that its impact upon local
society was such that it created a situation
in which the latter could only continue to
function by continuing to accept dependence
on the dominant external powers* (Brett,1973-13).

The concept of dependence stems from the works of
nationalist or socialist anti-imperialism theorists in Latin
America (Chilcote and £delstein,1974). It has been utilised
in many settings, including Africa (Amin,1972) and Canada
(cf. Levitt,1970;Laxer,1973)• Dependence as a concept in
development studies has profited much from the critiques of
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Frank's work (e.g. Oxaal,Barnett, and Booth,1975); and
although attempts have been made to condemn the validity of
its use (e.g. Lall,1975), no alternative more feasible
concept has been advanced to describe the fundamental link
between development and underdevelopment in integrated
economic systems.

For Brookfield(1975), the concept of dependence
underpins his theory of interdependent development. Regrettably, Brookfield's(1975) discourse on interdependent
development tends to cloud the precise nature of interdependence. It is assumed here that '...the continuing
interest of metropolitan capitalists in the
underdeveloed countries, where today this
involves investment in manufacturing more than
in primary production, implies some economic
development, but dependent development...'(BarrattBrown,1974:234), and further, as Brookfield(1975) would
agree, some interdependence too.

However, the balance of

benefits is not encompassed in the term 'interdependent
development' and this deficiency gives rise to the notion
of symmetrical and asymmetrical interdependence,

Chilcote(1974) clarifies the theoretical association
between dependence and internal colonialism, in which case
a peripheral society is dependent upon a society at the
economic core of a country.

He also draws attention to

the new structures of dependence whereby foreign firms
replace

the colonial metropole in dominating the economy
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of an underdeveloped state.

These structures are dealt

with in the following section and again in Chapter Five.

2.4 Internal Colonialism
Hechter(1975) formulates a model of internal colonialism and demonstrates its utility in his study of the
disadvantaged Celtic *fringe* in the context of Britain*s
development between the years 1536 and 1966. The postulates
and conclusions of Hechter*s(1975) analysis are enlarged
upon and reinforced here by way of reference to other
approaches to internal colonial structures; in particular
to those dealing with internal colonialism in South Africa.

Natioi. ^1 development, according to Hechter (1975 ),
may come about in the process *...by which a state
characterized by sectional, or otherwise competing economies, polities, and cultures,
within a given territory, is transformed into
a society composed of a single, all-pervasive,
and in this sense "national" economy, polity,
and culture* (Hechter,1975:17). Impediments to national development may thus be broken down into problems of
cultural, economic, and political integration and/or separation. The overriding problem of integration is rooted
ir the existence of *...two collectivities or
objectively distinct cultural groups:(l)the
core, or dominant cultural group which occupies territory extending from the political
center of the society (e.g.the locus of the
central government) outward to those territories largely occupiied by the subordinate,
ox (2) peripheral cultural group* (Hechter,1975:13).
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The dimensions of the model in spatial, economic,
political, and. wltural terms are postulated by Hechter
(1975) as follows : *The spatially uneven wave of
modernization over state territory creates
relatively advanced and less advanced groups.
As a consequence of this initial fortuitous
advantage, there is crystallization of the
unequal distribution of resources and power
between the two groups. The superordinate
group, or core, seeks to stabilize and monopolize its advantages through policies aiming
at the institutionalization of the existing
stratification system. It attempts to regulate
the allocation of social roles such that those
roles commonly defined as having high prestige
are reserved for its members. Conversely,
individuals from the less advanced group are
denied access to these roles. This stratification
system, which may be termed a cultural division
of labor, contributes to the development of
distinctive ethnic identification in the two
groups. Actors come to categorize themselves
and others according to the range of roles
each may be expected to play. They are aided
in this categorization by the presence of
visible signs, or cultural markers, which are
seen to characterize both groups. At this
stage, acculturation does not occur because
it is not in the interests of institutions
within the core* (Hechter,1975-9).

From these conditions (which aptly apply to the
South African case) arises the internal colony, which
Hechter(1975) equates with the periphery.

Hechter(1975)

asserts, furthermore, that when the periphery suffers
economic disadvantages as well as being culturally distinct
•...the likelihood of increasing regional equality appears
to be even more remote* (Hechter,1975:133)• This argument
he illustrates by way of reference to the consequences of
industrialization in Britain (i.e. the 'spatially uneven

24

wave of modernization') for regional equity.

He is able to

conclude that : *Group consciousness among the Welsh
and Scottish in the nineteenth century arose
around cultural symbols which differentiated
these regions from England; whereas in the
twentieth century such consciousness has been
stimulated by an awareness of persisting regional underdevelopment. Bureaucratic administration
seldom seems to enable less advantaged groups
to achieve resources equal to those of the
dominant groups. Hence disadvantaged groups
are likely to demand that decision-making be
"localized" so that their special problems
might become appreciated and therefore taken
into account in the allocation process* (Hechter,1975:
310).

Cnly a few salient aspects of Kechter*s(1975) model
have been extracted to provide the basis upon which to
devise a model of internal colonialism pertinent to the
South African situation.

Clearly, Hechter(1975) has present-

ec

* s conflict model of national development under given con-

ditions.

For him *...national development may be inhibited

by the desires of the peripheral group for independence
from a situation perceived to be exploitative* (Hechter,
1975:10).

This feature of his model is worthy of special

attention and is taken up again in the next section of the
chapter.

As Hechter(1975) remarks, his model is yet imperfect
and one significant point of ambiguity lies in the territorial expression of internal colonialism.

When he writes

of core and periphery he i3 applying the terms to conscious
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collectivities and not necessarily to the spatial arrangement of society, although he does imply that the core
(cultural group) and the core (spatial locus of capital and
power) may coincide - *The core collectively practices discrimination against the culturally distinct peoples who
have been forced onto less accessible inferior lands* (Hechter, 1975=32).

Hechter(1975) pronounces his ambiguous stand

on the territoriality of internal colonialism in a reference
to Blauner*s(1969) consideration of American blacks as an
internal colony.

Casanova(1965) and. Stavenhagen(1965)

offer no finite resolution to this problem although they
too imply a coincidence of spatial peripherality and economic disadvantage on the one hand and wealth generated by
the exploitation of the rural populace with economic and
urban cores on the other hand.

In the South African instance, Carter, Karis, and
Stultz(1967) analyse

the Transkei as a 'domestic colony*.

Historical analysis lead* them to equate the relationship
between Transkei and government in South Africa with
imperialistic forces from which originated colonialism.
In the latter case, colonialism was nurtured in a territory divorced from the metropolitan colonial power,
whereas domestic colonialism signals colonialism within the territory of the colonising state.

Regrettably,

their theoretical formulations are somewhat limited.
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Wolpe(1975) develops a stronger theoretical
framewoz-k in his application of the internal colonialism
model to South Africa. He establishes the association
between territorial deprivation and spatial and cultural peripherality in noting that '...the "underdeveloped" (and "underdeveloping") condition
of subordinate ethnic and racial groups and
the geographical areas they occupy within the
boundaries of the state, is produced and maintained by the same mechanisms of cultural
domination, political oppression, and economic
exploitation which, at the international level,
produce the development of the advanced capitalist states through the imperialist underdevelopment of the colonial satellites' (Wolpe,1975). Else
where, it is stated that 'The convergence, albeit
unevenly, of economic and political powerlessness with "blackness", together with the legitimating racial ideology, gives the society its
unique internal colonial nature...* (Wolpe,1970).

Wolpe(1975) contemplates the integration of labour
from the black areas of South Africa into the 'capitalist
circuit of production' and arrives at the conclusion that
'This "crossing" of different modes of production modifies the relationship between wages
and the cost of reproducing labour-power in
favour of capital. It is precisely this relationship which i3 the foundation of "internal
colonialism" in South Africa' (Wolpe,1975),

2.5 Internal Colonialism veraros Other Models
The problem of inadequacies of orthodox models
of development is aggravated for the student of development
in South Africa, where the subjugation of blacks by whites
is accompanied by the territorial segregation of the population on an ethnic basis to forge a spatial pattern of
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economy and society unique to South Africa.

Geographers have contributed to a description of
the spatial polarisation of the South African economy in a
few dominant cores (e.g. Fair,1975), arid they have noted
the authority-dependency relationship between core and
periphery in South Africa (Schmidt,1975).

The level of

understanding attained, however, has been impeded because
development in South Africa has usually been conceptualised
by geographers as a problem of economic integration, and
this at the national scale.

Thus, while the spatial pattern

of economic concentration and regional spread of economic
productivity have been described, there has been a failure
to explain the processes of capitalist development and
related underdevelopment.

Theories of economic integration

lead the analyst to the conclusion that development may be
achieved by opening the way for increased capital investment from developed regions or countries in underdeveloped
areas.

That is, answers in the quest for development are

being sought within the paradigm which inspires core
development, and peripheral underdevelopment is not necessarily perceived as a function of core development, or in
its relationship with the development of capitalism outside
of South Africa.

The actual mechanisms which gave rise to

the economic core-periphery dichotomy in the first place
are taken for granted and it is in these workings that the
answers must be.
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On similar grounds, there are those who suggest
that, the devices of modernization, if diffused throughout
the space economy, will lead to the elimination of underdevelopment.

Criticisms of this view (e.g. Brcokfield,1973)

generally point to the fact that modernization usually
implies an introduction of capitalism into pre-capitalist
society and functions to benefit development at metropolitan cores to the detriment of the periphery.

Criticisms which may be levelled at discourses on
development through a process of modernization may equally
well be posited against theories of development through
innovation diffusion in space.

Diffusion of innovations

must be subjected to deeper analysis before it may be
argued that uhe diffusion process is concomitant with
development.

The innovations need to be understood as

modified or novel instruments either for the perpetuation
or for the change of socio-economic structures.

It may

wall be that an innovation, as it it, diffused through
space, works to accelerate development at the core and
underdevelopment at the periphery.

Expressed in these

terms, it is not difficult to visualise a possible conformity between the notion of modernisation and that of
innovation diffusion.

Integrationist and diffusionist theories may find
more valid application in non-exploitative settings, but
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so long as exploitative structures of economy and society
survive, these structures must be analysed in terms of
an alternative theory, namely conflict theory.

Until

the structures upholding core-periphery discrimination in
the distribution of the social product are eradicated,
conflict theory predicts confrontation within society.

Hechter(1975) summarises the distinction between
diffusion models of development and the internal colonialism
model as follows : 'Given similar initial conditions,
the mutual isolation of core and periphery,
these models...predict different outcomes for
national development following the heightening of interaction between these regions.
While the diffusion model predicts a lessening of regional economic inequalities, the
internal colonial model predicts that these
will persist or increase. While the diffusion
model suggests the probability of peripheral
acculturation, the internal colonial model
suggests the likelihood of an assertion of the
peripheral culture in reaction to domination
of the core. Finally, while the diffusion
model states that functional political cleavages should characterize political behavior
in all regions of the society, the internal
colonial model states that political cleavages
will largely reflect significant cultural
differences between groups' (Hechter,1975:1C).

2.6 Summary
Development geography is undergoing transformation.
Redefinitions in the discipline are largely responses to
shifting ideological commitments on the part of its practicioners.

Among the repercussions of this evident change

has been the elevation of certain theories to supersede
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those currently applied in South Africa.

In this chapter, the internal colonialism model
has been put forward as an appropriate substitute for
models which are found to be wanting when it comes to
isolating the problem of underdevelopment in South Africa.

The spatially uneven wave of modernization under
the control of white settlers and capitalists; the racial
division of labour and associated discriminatory wage
structure; and the political subjugation cf blacks in
South Africa are criteria which denot«"M««ks in South
Africa as an internal colcny.

Theoretically, this places

blicks in a position of dependence upon the core, and with
increasing dependence blacks will seek to terminate the
so;io-economic structures of exploitation.

These issues

and th'j question of the territorial basis for the internal
colony are addressed in the following chapters, in terms
of the spatial impact of state and capital in Natal.
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CHAPTER THREE
TERRITORIAL FRAGMENTATION OF NATAL

3.1 Introduction
The interplay among the parties ccncerned with the
question of land partitioning in Natal is dealt with in
this chapter.

Discussion focusses on the relationship

between state and capitcl and their combined role in implementing the fragmentation of Natal.

The narrative begins

with the origins of the reserve system in nineteenth
century colonial Natal, and ends with a portrayal of the
condition of KwaZulu in 1971 - sixty years after the
establishment of Union and ten years after the Union had
become the Republic of South Africa.

The chapter exposes

ho ft the territorial fragmentation of Natal {?>.?.) was
followed by the penetration and fragmentation of Zululand
by white interests (3-3).

Developments between 1910 and

1971 are then considered (3-4).

Ideological transform-

ations at uhe core before 1971 are dealt wioh (3-5), and
peripheral responses are outlined (3.6).

KvjaZulu is then

set in the perspective of the South African space economy
in 1971 (3-7), before the partial consolidation proposals
were made. A brief summary of the chapter is then presented
(3.3).

3.2 The Reserves
Settlement of whites in Natal commenced in 13?4
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with the first English residents at Pert Natal (Durban).
Shortly afterwards, across the Drakensoerg mountains in
the west of the territory came Voortrekkers

who estab-

lished government over 'Natalia' in 1333, a year after
their- arrival.

Under the Volksraad , farms of ?,500ha

were generally allocated gratis to all white citizens of
the Natalia Republic, some receiving two for services
considered meritorious by the community (Christopher,1971).
An influx of thousands of Zulus into Natalia in flight
froj; wars in Zululand alarmed the Volksraad and ics
members resolved in 1341 to pressure all refugees into the
area between the Mtamvuma and Mzimvubu rivers (Welsh,1971)^.

British intervention in the political affairs of
the region prevented the Volksraad resolution from ever
reaching fruition.

Earlier refusals by British government

to annex the settlement at Port Natal were reversed in an
assertion of sovereignty over the entire colony of Natal
in 1343 and the appointment of Henry Cloete as British Lands
Commissioner in Natal (Vtelsh,1971).

Intervention cul-

minated in the annexation of Natal as a British colony
in 1345, after two years as a district of Eritain's Cape
Colony, and it was accorded the status of responsible government by the imperial government in 1393.

Within a few months of annexation in 1343, a
Locations Commission was set up by the colonial government
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Map 3.

Natal : Magisterial Districts
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to provide reserves for the blacks in Natal, whom by Cloete's
estimates numbered between 30,000 and 100,000 in that year
(Welsh,1971).

The establishment of locations, or reserves,

was perceived as necessary '...because freehold
ownership not only was an unknown concept to
the tribal African but also would have exposed
him to the danger of land-hungry Europeans'(•Brookes
and Hurwitz,1957:1).

In its report of March, 1347, the

commission recommended that provision be made for about
ten reserves interspersed among white farms and each accomodating 10,000 blacks so that individual black families
would have about 40ha of land suitable for grazing and
crop production (Brookes and Hurwitz,1957).

Although

these conditions were not realised in their entirety, the
creation of reserves had already begun with the demarcation in November, 1346 of the Zwartkop reserve for about
3,000 blacks (see Map No. 4 ) . In March, 1347 the Umvoti,
Umlazi, and Inanda reserves were demarcated (Brookes and
Hurwitz,1957).

By 1349, with the addition of the Umzin-

yati, Impofana, and Kahlamba reserves, there were seven
reserves in Natal (Brookes and Hurwitz,1957).

The outcome of the 1349 Land Commission in Natal
was an easing of existing constraints on land by government
to whites and the immediate repercussion of the commission's
recommendations was the division of over 300,000ha among
360 white claimants, amongst whom were many of Ratal's
leading land speculators (Slater,1975).

Slater(1975) estab-

lishes the association between land speculation in colonial
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Natal and London-based capital as well as linking capital
with political interests in the colony.

Thus, the '...in-

terests of the colonial merchant-landowners coincided with
those of powerful interest groups in the metropolis' (Slater,1975).

Among the means of extracting profitable returns
on land investments was the promotion of settlement schemes
in Natal which would give to British immigrants land and
employment in an ostensibly thriving cotton growing region.
The plots of land involved were sufficiently small for
immigrants either to purchase further land from the speculators or to abandon farming and re-sell their land to
the land-holding companies.

So it was that by 13^0,

fifteen of the leading speculators in Natal owned
233,400ha of land (Christopher,1969;Slater.1975).

The Natal Land and Colonisation Company, the
major firm engaged in land speculation, had 'powerful
friends' (Slater,1975) in London and some of the senior
company officials were in Natal's Legislative Council.
During a dispute following the stagnation of the colonial
sector of the rural economy (due to 3abour and capital
shortages), two of Natal's largest landowners campaigned
in the Legislative Council to force blacks living on white
farms to work for the whites (Slater,1975).

On the other-

side, many landowners, including the Natal Land and Col-
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onisation Company, lobbied for a system by which landowners would extract rent in the form of cash or produce
from black 'tenants'.

A compromise favouring the latter

group was achieved and this influenced the decision to
introduce indentured labourers from India into the colony
(Slater,1975).

Virtually indiscriminate Crown-land disposal to
whites under low rental conditions disturoed the imperial
government which, in 1353, had the laws permitting these
land grants repealed.

The area of alienated land in

Natal remained almost unchanged until twenty years later,
in the late l370's (Christopher,1971). By 1374, roughly
two-thirds of Natal colony's total area had been alienated.
Of the alienated land, one sixth had been set aside as
reserves for occupance by blacks (de Kiewiet,1937).

By

1332 a total of 42 reserves and 21 mission reserves covered
over 390,000ha (Brookes and Hurwitz,1957).

Changing credit facilities affected changing
patterns of Crown-land allocation to whites (Christopher,
1971), but the position of blacks vis-a-vis access to
land remained untempered, following the 1332 report of
the Natal Native Commission (Colony of Natal,1332).

The

report, in which it was established that approximately
55% of Natal's 375,000 blacks lived on white-owned land
(either private or Crown land), recojimended that the
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areal extent of the reserves should remain unchanged and
that land sales to blacks in the reserves should still be
prohibited.

Outside the reserves, where some blacks held

title to land, through the introduction of 'better modes
of cultivation', progress might be made '...to elevate
the owners in the human scale...' (Colony of Natal,1332:26)^.

Shortly before the annexation of Zululand to Natal
in 1397, the distribution of blacks in Natal was reported
to be as follows : locations and mission reserves - 254,331;
private (white) lands - 253,354; Crown lands - 21,699
(Colony of Natal,1396).

The proportion of blacks on white

land was 52.4% of the total black population of Natal,
showing little variation since 1332, and mirroring

thus

the minor changes in land alienation over that time.
Printed fifty years after the first white settlers landed
in Natal, the figures illustrate how an exogenous influence
had superimposed on the landscape a pattern based on monetary value, and with relative disregard for the local
populace.

Blacks simply acauired the title of squatter

or tenant as boundaries were drawn about their traditional
territory in response to market forces beyond their control.
The successful territorial fragmentation of Natal relied
heavily upon co-operation with or participation in government, also exclusive to the exogenous group.
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3.3 Whites Penetrate Zululand
Penetration of Zululand by white settler farmers
began after 1332, when Transvaal Boers started occupying
land which W A S later set up as the New Republic in northwestern Zululand (see Map No.l) (Keppel-Jones,1949). This
outpost of the South African Republic (Transvaal), and the
land subsequently added to it and known as Proviso B, was,
according to the Boers, a concession to them by the Zulu
King Cetewayo whom they claimed to have assisted in an
inter-tribal war.
the concession5.

Confusion surrounds the conditions of
Nevertheless, the area came under

white control and was eventually annexed to Natal at the
time of tht Anglo-Boer War of 1399 to 1902 (KeppelJones,1949).

Whereas some Natalians had entertained the idea
of using Zululand as a suitable place for blacks displaced from their colony, it was perceived by others as
an exploitable hinterland.

The latter group, comprising

mainly farmers, had in the 1390's imposed much pressure
on the Colonial Governor to allow white occupation of
southern Zululand (Marks,1970).

Annexation served the

ideals of these petitioners well and it clearly had the
effect of extending into Zululand conditions of land
partitioning similar to those in Natal.
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On the 29 t n December, 1397, the Prime Minister
of Natal signed the Act (Act No.37, 1397) for the annexation of Zululand to Natal.

Earlier in that year, the

Secretary of State for the British Colonies had detailed
to the Governor of Natal, Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson, the
conditions under which he would advise Gueen Victoria to
assent to the annexation of Zululand to Natal. The
primary condition was that the existing land tenure system
in Zululand remain unaffected for a period of five years
after annexation, and that no grants of land be made to
whites during that time.

In the interim, a joint Imperial

and Colonial committee was to be set up to delimit reserves
within Zulu -^nd. After the lapse of five years, the
Natal Government would be free to dispose of the unreserved land at its own discretion and also to proclaim
townships '...if such townships should become necessary
in conseouence of progressive mining enterprise'(Great
Britain Correspondence relating to Zululand,17.5.1397).

+- Vi

In a minute to Prime Minister Binns on 3

October-,

1397, Governor Sir Hely-Hutchinson suggested that it would
be expedient that no changes be made whatsoever for about
two years after the annexation, and 'In that case
the Joint Boundary Commission would not be
appointed after this interval...had elapsed,
and should then proceed to carry out their
work by degrees, allowing ample time for its
performance so that there mav be no cause for
sudden or unnecessary excitement among the
Native Population' (Great Britain:Corr. relating to
Zululand,3.10.1397)

He also supposed that '...many
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of the farmers who come into the country
later on will be glad to let the Natives remain
where they are, cultivating their small mealie
patches, and to levy rent from them, treating
them as servants. In any case the work of
delimitation will be a matter requiring much
careful handling' (Great Britain:Corr. relating to
Zululand,3.10.1897).

In a subsequent despatch to

Chamberlain, Hely-Hutchinson was able to claim that the
announcement of the impending annexation '...has been
favourably received by the Natives in Zululand, but without any particular enthusiasm' (Great Britain:Corr.
relating to Zululand,19.11.1897).

The two-man Zululand Lands Delimitation Commission conducted their enquiry over two years. Their
recommendations, reported in October 1904, were accepted
by the imperial government in their entirety.

Twenty one

reserves were delimited, covering an area of one and a half
million ha. (Colony of Natal,1905).

These reserves were

vested in the Zululand Native Trust under a deed of
grant in 19096.

In a retrospective statement, a member of the
above commission and former Chief Magistrate of Zululand
from 1898 until 1906, Sir Chas. Saunders, stated that
although the Imperial Government had accepted the commission's recommendations, the Natal Government had made
objections because not enough land had been made available
for whites.

He felt that had he been aware of the fact
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that blacks would be unable to acquire title to land in
Zululand, he would not have agreed to the quantity of land
that the commission proposed for white purchase (Union
of South Africa,19l6(2)).

Sugar cane cultivation became

the dominant prac-

tice of whites settling in Zululand and their economic
success was given an impetus by the concessions offered
by government to sugar cane growers and millers who
would settle in Zululand.

Tenders were called for the

construction of sugar mills which would serve concession
holders only.

Sir J.L.Hulett submitted the successful

tender and built his first mills at Felixton in 1908,
and at Amatikulu in 1911 (Osborne,1964).

The alliance established between government and
white agriculturalists and early industrialists facilitated
and legitimised the process of territorial fragmentation
and economic penetration.

Thus, at the time of Union

in 1910, 75,710 of the 266,066 blacks in Zululand were
on alienated land (Union of South Africa,1911).

3.4 Union and After
Following Union, the South African government
passed legislation enforcing racial segregation in all
four of the country's constituent provinces.

The 1913
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Native Land Act made provision for 2,667,000ha of
'scheduled Native Areas' in Natal, in the form of 69
locations and 19 mission reserves, thus formalising the
existing reserve system (Natal henceforth embraces Zululand, except where otherwise signified).

A commission was then charged with the task of
delimiting further areas for black occupation '...so
that future adjustments of land areas may not be necessary' (Union of South Africa,19l6:4) and submitted its
report to Parliament in 1916.

The Beaumont Commission

recommended the addition of l,595,OOOha to the areas
scheduled in the 1913 Act for the blacks of Natal. In
seeking to lessen friction between blacks and whites
through the consolidation of the reserves, the commission
'...found it impossible to follow consistently
this priciple on account of the objections
which were raised to the inclusion of Europeanoccupied farms within proposed Native areas.
The nature and extent, therefore, of the
proposed Native areas have been largely determined by this objection' (Union of South Africa,1916:4).
This stricture led to the selection of additional land
according to an '...order of preference:l)Mission lands;
2)Native-owned lands;
3)Crown lands;
4)unoccupied European-owned lands;
5)European-owned lands solely occupied by Natives, and;
6)lastly, where this could not be avoided, land
in actual occupation by Europeans' (Union of South
Africa,1916:11).
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Giving evidence before the commission, whites
displayed their concern with black-white territorial
relationships in strong, if not often insular terms. A
member of the Legislative Assembly advocated that 'Segregation is good for both races and better control can be
kept of the natives in the locations' (Union of South
Africa,1916(2):423).

Another member, in an expression

of some foresight, suggested that appropriate steps
should be taken '...in order that they (blacks)
may work and govern themselves within certain
limits as self-contained communities independent
of the white population'(Union of South Africa,1916
(2):424).

There was common resentment shown for absentee
ownership?, as well as the expression of the opinion
that the reserves were not crowded but that they were
poorly cultivated and that this should not jeopardise
white control over land. Senator Sir J.L.Hulett, industrial and agricultural capitalist, contended that 'If
the natives cultivated and used the land in
a civilised manner there would be more room
for them in the reserves', and '...if any
areas were declared "neutral" areas in which
either whites or blacks could purchase land...
In the long run the land would all fall into
the hands of the Europeans' (Union of South Africa,
1916(2):433ff).

Another contentious issue was black urbanisation.
Many whites opposed moves which might encourage this
and often proposed that blacks be permitted to buy land
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outside the reserves, but only in rural areas. Contentious too was the fact that mission reserves allotted
land, in some cases, to blacks converted to Christianity
and admitted to the reserve.

The magistrate of Verulam

found this to be '...a rank injustice, and these Mission
Reserves are rank humbugs* (Union of South Africa,1916(2)f
444).

Tenants, that is blacks on white-owned property
who were in the employ of the owners as a condition of
being there since before its alienation, were the subjects of much debate. One sugar planter declared :
'The way that I get rid of obnoxious Kaffirs
is as follows : I lease the land to a coolie
and he cultivates all round and crowds them
up so that eventually they go, and then I get
rid of the coolie' (Union of South Africa,1916(2):45D.

The majority of black witnesses before the
Beaumont Commission were tribal chiefs, although a few
black landowners also gave evidence.

Their opposition

to the white viewpoint, by requesting more reserve land
and permission to get tenure of land outside the reserves,'
is discussed later, in section 3.6 of this chapter.

The recommendations of the Beaumont Commission
were rejected by Parliament in Cape Town and five separate
local commissions were appointed on a regional basis to
revise its findings and proposals.

In 1918, the report
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of Mr. Maurice Evans on the Natal reserves was submitted
to Parliament (Union of South Africa,1918).

The two-

man committee had inspected all the areas recommended by
the 1916 Commission, travelling on horseback and on foot.
Among its observations was that '...when one considers the fertile and profitable sugar belt
of the coast, the rich agricultural portions
of the Midlands, and the healthy stock-lands
of the uplands, and compares these with the
rough, stony, often precipitous native areas
in the sub-coastal districts and the hot, dry,
thorn valleys higher up country, it is perfectly certain that the prairie or unimproved value
of the European lands are very much higher
than those allocated to the natives' (Union of South
Africa,1918).

The recommendations of this commission were also
rejected in Parliament and it was not until 1936 that
provision was made for the addition of more land to the
reserves as scheduled in 1913.

The Native Trust and

Land Act(Act No. 18 of 1936) added 450,000ha to the
Natal reserves, mostly adjacent to the existing reserves
so as not to further fragment white lands or to alter
the white corridors and enclaves (Best and Young,forthcoming).

Areas listed as Released Areas in this Act

were released from the provisions of the 1913 Act and made
available for purchase by the South African Native Trust.

When, in 1948, the National Party came to power,
it appointed a commission '...to conduct an exhaustive enquiry into and to report on a comprehensive scheme for the rehabilitation of the
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Native Areas with a view to developing within
them a social structure in keeping with the
culture of the Native and based on effective
socio-economic planning' (Union of South Africa,1955).
Appointed late in 1950, the Tomlinson Commission, named
after its chairman Prof. Tomlinson, submitted four years
later an eighteen volume report, almost 4,000 pages in
length.

Dealing with the spatial configuration of the
reserves, the commission recommended the consolidation
of 'Bantu Areas' into seven blocks about 'historicological heartlands' (Union of South Africa.1955(16):50).
Within Natal, it was proposed, the Ingwavuma area should
go to Swaziland and the 'Bantu Area' be consolidated
about the Zulu heartland, north of the Durban-Pietermaritzburg line (see Maps No's. 2 & 3)•

Existing 'Bantu

Areas' south of Durban were more closely tied to the
Transkei.

Crown lands should be used first in the con-

solidation of the 'Bantu Areas'.

Construed within the ideals of segregation and
the termination of the migrancy of blacks to white cities,
active decentralisation planning began after, and largely
in spite of, the tabling of the Tomlinson Commission
report.

Arguing that agricultural output had to be

improved and other economic activities introduced in order
to develop the reserves, the commission called for the
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establishment of industries within the reserves (Union
of South Africa,1955).

This recommendation was rejected

by government and decentralisation policy was designed to
encourage industrial location in the border areas abutting
the reserves .

Thus, '...security would be ensured for
white civilization and opportunities created
for both racial groups in all spheres, each
in its own territory or among its own people if after a period of fifty years an approximately
eoual proportion of whites and Bantu has been
reached in European territory* (Union of South Africa,
1956:3). Furthermore, 'The Government regards the
development of industries owned by Europeans
but reauiring large numbers of native labourers
in suitable European areas near Bantu territory
as of the utmost importance for the sound socioeconomic development of the Bantu areas and
intends to take the necessary steps gradually
to create the desired conditions for attracting
industries to such areas' (Union of South Africa,
1956:9).

Incentives to industrialists were first offered
in I960 by Prime Minister Verwoerd, who had, in his
capacity as Minister of Native Affairs, voiced strong
opposition in 1956 to the idea of promoting white-owned
industry ^n?the reserves.

Evidently insufficient to

attract private industry to the border areas, the inducements were supplemented by others in 1964.

Industrial decentralisation still did not
accelerate and the Physical Planning and Utilization of

49

ResourcesnAct of 1967 instituted restrictive measures
to limit industrialisation in the cities, thus effectively
trying to force decentralisation.

The Act also opened the

way for white industrialists to locate plants within the
•homelands' with the Bantu Investment Corporation (first instituted by government to promote black industrialisation
in the reserves) acting as agents and as a source of loan
capital.

Further incentives followed in 1968, among

which were tax holidays of up to five years for decentralising industrialists (Financial Mail.30.3.1973 federated
Chambers of Industries,1973). Studies have revealed the
measure of success achieved in respect of these persuasive
efforts to be minimal (Rogerson,1974a;1974b).

Paralleling attempts to promote economic growth
in the reserves was the evolution of constitutional machinery to bring the reserves to eventual political independence from the rest of South Africa, through a series of
phases.

In 1959 the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government

Act provided for the investiture of a black 'territorial
authority* as the highest organ of internal administration
for each reserve complex. Subsequently, a black 'legislative
assembly* would be established to supersede the 'territorial
authority'.

Further legislation followed in the Bantu

Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970 and the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act of 1971 which allowed for the next
phase whereby a 'homeland' with a 'legislative assembly'
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would become a 'self-governing territory'.
phase would be full political independence.

The final
Progression

through these phases is controlled by the white central
government and it is only when the final phase is reached
that the black 'legislative assembly' may decide to accept
political independence or not".

The antecedents of the territorial organisation
of South Africa in general and Natal in particular have
been considered above.

Attention turns now to the trans-

forming ideologies in which the forementioned developments
were rooted.

3.5 Ideological Transformations at the Core
For the very reason that the core and peripheral
'conscious collectivities' in South Africa are historically divisible on racial grounds does the notion of
accomodation between the two white groups imply a bond
which transcends the nationalism of Afrikaners or the
laissez-faire liberalism of the English.

Two factors predominate in the analysis on
cohesion of the white core.
of white supremacy.

Firstly, there is the aspect

Secondly, whether seen as a means

or an end, a capitalist economy under white control is
fostered by both white groups today.
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The sources and manifestations of Afrikaner
nationalism are extensively documented.

Munger(1967)

distinguishes in South Africa two nationalisms, Afrikaner
and African, '...revolving around each other like a binary
star and far outshining the weak light of a nebulous South
African nationalism' (Munger,1967:1).

For Stultz(1974),

the success of Afrikaner nationalism cannot be measured
independently of the role of English-speaking whites in
South African politics.

A black view holds that 'It is

in the Afrikaner's preoccupation with considerations of
survival that the crux of South Africa's race problem lies.
The solution is also there' (Ngubane,1963:15); and an
Afrikaner view has it that 'The apartheid idea is...preeminently peculiar to the Afrikaner...'(Rhoodie and
Venter,1959:17), and '...apartheid is not, as it is so
often quite incorrectly alleged, a static state of affairs
designed to keep the Bantu for ever subservient to the
White man.

On the contrary, apartheid is a dynamic

process which holds the promise of complete self-determination in the future' (Rhoodie and Venter,1959:vii).

The ideologies of the English-speaking whites
constitute the other fundamental component of the core.
British imperialism in South Africa left this group in
control of a rapidly evolving capitalist economy.

Although

not discernably nationalistic in any sense, the English-
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speaking whites are characterised, in South African history, by their pragmatic, liberal capitalism.

This

'liberalism' catered for early segregation in South Africa
which was, ostensibly, protectionism based on humanitarian
principles (see Welsh,1971:27, for example).

In the

transformation from imperially-dominated to locally-orientated capitalism in South Africa, the major impulses came
from English-speaking ideologists.

Bozzoli(1975), deal-

ing with the ideological impetus for local manufacturing,
illuminates this important facet of the development of
capitalism in South Africa.

The place of capitalism in the core is significant
for it represents the pervading bond between the two white
groups at the core and it is toward this bond which
transformations at the core have moved.

That is, '...re-

lations between capitalist development, apartheid policies
and the core structure of white supremacy are essentially
collaborative.. . • (Johnston,1970).

After the mineral discoveries near Kimberley in
1870 and on the Witwatersrand in 1886, Afrikaners linked
imperialism with capitalism and 'The notion of
"Englishness" thus evoked for the Afrikaner
the three great evils which threatened his
separate existence - imperialism, capitalism,
and egalitarian liberalism' (Moodie,1975:15)- Afrikaners combatted this perceived threat to their identity
by assuming an increasingly important role in capitalist
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development (De Klerk,1975 writes of the Afrikaner as a
'new man'). For them, capitalism had to be '...transformed from its base in liberal individualism
to an ethnic system which would work to the
good of the Afrikaner People as a nation. This
was to be achieved by Afrikaner control of
both production and consumption. Afrikaner
capital should thus be organized to support
Afrikaner enterprise both by investment in
Afrikaner business and by purchase of Afrikaner
goods' (Moodie,1975:204).

Welsh(1972) considers apartheid as a response to
the threat of a growing class of acculturated blacks, and
Hill(1964) asserts that 'The irreducible core of the
policy is fear' (Hill,1964:3) • The net result of transformations at the cere which gave rise to and which
maintain white supremacy are interpreted by Adam(1976) as
a 'de-ideologised power conflict' wherein the role of
ideologies is merely to defend white privileges.
Politically, the Afrikaner government of today is only
codifying and legalising 'a well established custom*
(Adam,1975) of segregation started by the English.
Economically, the Afrikaners have sought increased power
in a capitalist system.

The convergence of features of

ideologies held by both white groups at the core pivots
on the issue of white supremacy in the economic and Political arenas of the country.

In Natal, the spatial impact of these ideological
transformations reflected colonial penetration processes.
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At first, the trekker republic of Natalia sought to
offer its *citizens* free access to land, in fulfilment
of its sectarian, rather than capitalistic ideals. The
land pattern inherited by the British was not radically
altered during their period of dominion over the territory
(1843-1910), although land was now associated with a perceived need to generate surplus value, be it by speculation, extensive farming, or the extraction of rent
or labour from the occupants of the land.

The annex-

ation of Zululand extended the field of nascent capitalism.

After Union (1910), when land alienation became

the prerogative of the central South African government,
and with the closing of the ideologies of capitalism and
Afrikaner nationalism, the territorial segregation of
blacks from whites persisted, and is entrenched now
in legislation, in the continuing interest of white
state and capital.

3.6 Peripheral Response
Imposition of government upon blacks by the
white core prompted varying forms of response.

Colonial

government in Natal was confronted first by organised
and violent force, which it repulsed10.

Opposition to

the core then came from vociferous but mainly non-violent
sources operating within and without the structure of
legal authority upheld by the core.

In I960 peripheral

response took on a new face after the core attempted to
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quell opposition by recourse to the legal system.

The

outlawing of black organisations intent on altering the
racially-based core-periphery structure was followed by
the creation of a new outlet for black opposition within
the core dominated system of authority, in the form of
black *homeland* governments.

Black involvement with

the territorial fragmentation of Natal by white interests
is discussed in this section.

Incited by factors such as the diminishing land
available (and necessary) in traditional tribal society,
and their limited access to capital and their subordination
vis-a-vis whites, blacks responded in a variety of ways.
In Natal, the voice of black opposition came from the
black press (John Dube founded the first Zulu newspaper,
Ilanga Lase Natal, in 1904), from tribal chiefs petitioning
government, from the literate blacks emanating usually
from missionary schools (the kholwa class), and from
black organisations such as the Natal Native Congress.

Welsh(1972) provides some insight into the opinions
expressed by the black press.

A common grievance in the

early 1900*s was the inability of literate blacks to
participate in the political affairs of the colony of
Natal.

Tribal chiefs also lamented their subordinate

status in the political decision making affecting their
territorial claims.

However, this class of blacks
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usually defended traditionalism, something which many of
the amakholwa did not subscribe to.

Thus, in their

evidence before the Beaumont Commission, for example, many
of the amakholwa witnesses asked to be allowed to purchase
land outside the reserves (Union of South Africa,1916(2)).
It was also apparent that most blacks who did at the time
held title to land in Natal were from the kholwa class.

Chiefs usually expressed satisfaction with the
reserve system but called for more land and less interference. A chief from the Umlazi division maintained that
*The British came amongst us and we accepted
their rule. The land that was occupied by our
fathers they were ousted from, but they lived
peaceably on the land on which we were born.
We have never quarrelled with the Government
that they may say to-day that the Europeans
and the natives should be separated* (Union of South
Africa,19l6(2):455).

Another, Chief Stephen Mini,

contended that *The particular method of land
administration for natives which we prefer
is the one that was followed by Sir Theo.
Shepstone. He originated the locations
which we have now, and that is what we like.
What we wish is that the present locations
shall be extended* (Union of South Africa,1916(2):531).

A black land owner complained that blacks were
troubled by *...a law which came about in 1843 from
the late Oueen, which provided that all races
in this country were to be treated alike, and
now to-day those orders have been broken without us black people being consulted* (Union of South
Africa,1916(2) :514).
the amakholwa.

This was a widely held view among
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The Natal Native Congress (NNC) constituted a
branch of the South African Native National Congress (SANC)
founded in 1912 by Dr. Pixley Seme 11 (Karis and Carter,
1972(1)).

The NNC actively opposed government and Martin

Lutuli, representing the Congress, stated before a South
African Native Affairs Commission sitting in Pretoria
that *The Natives look at it this way. Zululand
was our own land, and although now it is
under the Government, we ought to be the
first. We ought not to be prohibited* (Karis and
Carter,1972(1) :3D.

He was referring to the prohibition

of land buying by blacks, in the Zululand town of Eshowe
in particular.

At the national level, the SANC resolved in 1916
to call for a rejection of the report of the Natives
Land Commission and for the repeal of the 1913 Natives
Land Act.

Also criticised was the penetration of

Zululand by white interests, a breach of a Royal
proclamation (Karis and Carter,1972(l)).

Some thirty blacks from Natal, including John
Dube, were among the A00 delegates to the All African
Convention (AAC) in Bloemfontein in 1935 at the time
of the 9 8 t h anniversary of the Battle of Blood River(1837).
The meeting was convened by Pixley Seme, now as president
general of the African National Congress (ANC)(until 1923
the SANC), and Prof. Jabavu of the Cape Native Voters'
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Convention.

Motions passed at the meeting opposed the

1935 Land Bill and Representation of Natives Bill (Karis
and Carter,1972(2)). An observation unanimously approved
by the delegates was that *The true aim of land
adjustment...should be to provide the bulk
of the Native population, which is predominantly
rural, with sufficient land to allow of their
working a livelihood.
The fact that this aim is ignored by the Native
Land and Trust Bill can only be interpreted
by the African people as a vague attempt to
force them out of their reserves into a position
of economic dependency* (Karis and Carter,1972(2): 36 ).

Policies adopted later by the AAC included appeals
to government to accelerate the process of *releasing*
land

; to put an end to the eviction of blacks from

white-owned farms; to prevent the fostering of conditions
in the reserves which forced blacks to seek employment
outside the reserves, on unjust terms; and, the abolition
of restrictions on land purchases by blacks. These
policies were reiterated at various ANC annual conferences
too, although the AAC and ANC were never absolutely
united.

However, after the Sharpville affair in I960

the ANC and AAC were outlawed and black opposition was
forced to find expression through other avenues (Karis
and Carter,1972(2)).

It is apparent that the voices of black opposition
to the land policies of white government went largely unheeded at the core.

Peripherality of blacks constituted
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the result of concerted efforts at the core to retain
exclusive control over government, economy, and space.

Following the banning of the bodies most outspokenly critical of legislation affecting territorial
matters the most significant expressions of discontent
concerning land issues have emanated from the black
territorial authorities or legislative assemblies of
the *homelands*.

Their role is considered in the next

chapter.

3 -7 Contemporary Forms
Natal»s black population is viewed in this
passage in its relationship with the environment and
with the labour market.

At the outset it should be

stressed that the dynamics of apartheid complicate
attempts accurately to present the demographic characteristics of KwaZulu.

Changing *homeland* boundaries,

census data of dubious quality, government's typology
for human classification, dated or incomplete data
about agricultural and other resources, are factors which
militate against precision in the task of compilation.

Annual growth rates of the black population are
noted to vary between 2.9% p.a. (Maasdorp,1974) and
3, .2% p.a. (Lombard and van der Merwe,1972).

Taking a 3$p.a.

growth rate, it is estimated that the de facto pop-
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ulation of KwaZulu at present exceeds 2.5 million.

The

environment in which these people live is 58$ mountainous and about 70% of this is unsuited to crop production
(Horrell,1973)-

Another assessment notes that 13.9%

of KwaZulu*s total area is suitable dry arable land while
0.08% is suited to irrigation (Lombard and van der Merwe,
1972).

Although it has been suggested tfeat the territory
of KwaZulu could support a total population of 7.5 million
(Grobler,1972), it should be noted that this would require
nothing short of an agricultural revolution.

Maasdorp

(1974) points to the 1970 excess (in terms of carrying
capacity) of 300,000 cattle units in KwaZulu and the
related burden on the land so that parts of KwaZulu are
'...perhaps beyond rehabilitation'(Maasdorp,1976).
Apparent erosion and overstocking aside, agricultural
production on arable land is limited in extent and
efficiency.

Less than 80% of KwaZulu's arable land is

cultivated (Lombard and van der Merwe,1972) and the
incentives to increase and improve agriculture and
agricultural productivity are restricted primarily by
the limited access to capital in KwaZulu (Erwin,1974)•

Efforts at revising the agricultural sector have
included planning and investment by state, private white
enterprise, and KwaZulu authorities.

So-called planned
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areas in KwaZulu are those areas divided into arable
lands, grazing camps, and residential areas. By the end
of 1971 46.9% of KwaZulu had been planned in this manner (SAIRR.1973), and by the end of 1975, 49.1% (SAIRR,
1976).

The extent of agriculture undertaken specifically for trade and the generation of surplus value is
limited to 21,331.5ha in sugar cane production (Bantu,
7,1976), 2,866ha to cotton, and 665ha to coconuts and
cashew nuts (Anon,1973).

The afforested area of KwaZulu

is 17,069ha (Anon,1973).

In the early 1950 's, there were 1,453 black sugar
cane growers on 2,156ha of land, and it was proposed that
the area given to sugar cane production be increased to
51,012ha (Union of South Africa,1955).

In the 1972/3

sugar milling season, 2.5% of South Africa's sugar
production was accounted for by KwaZulu growers.

Until

1972, when the limit was lifted, each 'genuine' cane
grower qualified for 4ha of land (Bantu,7.1976).

In

contrast, white owned sugar farms are operated on a
plantation basis with perhaps hundreds of black labourers on each farm.

At present, all sugar cane is milled

by white owned factories located outside KwaZulu.
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The white-controlled South African sugar industry
is providing R5 million through the Small Growers
Financial Aid Fund for the development of 5,000ha of new
sugar lands to support a population of 30,000 and with
an envisaged annual revenue of R30 million.

Also

provided by the South African Sugar Association were
three farmers' centres to the KwaZulu government for
the education of black sugar farmers (Financial Mail.
23.5.1976).

The location of manufacturing industry in or
abutting KwaZulu is unlikely to offset the underdeveloped
agricultural sector and generate the capital necessary
to uplift the welfare of KwaZulu residents, as expected
by government.

By the end of 1971, there were an estimated 15
industries at Hammersdale, 9 at Newcastle, 5 at Ladysmith, 1 at Richards Bay, and ? at Isithebe (Lombard
and van der Merwe,1972) designated as potential decentrali
generators of capital for KwaZulu, as well as providing
employment for the increasing numbers of black workseekers.

These industries, all white owned, provided

direct employment opportunities for- 10,654 blacks,
including 84 at Isithebe in KwaZulu (Lombard and van
aer Merwe,1972).

Two years later Isithebe had 9 indust-

ries employing 40Q blacks (Financial Mai1,9.11.1973) and
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Richards Bay had, at the end of 1974, ten industries
employing 316 blacks (Financial Mail.17.1.1975)•

Inferences about the spatial distribution of
wealth in Natal may be drawn from Gross Geographic Product
data released by government (Republic of South Africa,1968).
These data are illustrative of economic polarisation in
urban cores; they reflect the abundance of wealth in
white agricultural areas; and, they point to the concomitant economic deprivation in KwaZulu.

However,

only limited conclusions on the distribution of income
by racial group may be arrived at as the data are
aggregated by magisterial district.

In 1968, 68.9% of Natal»s geographic product was
accounted for in the magisterial districts of Durban,
Pinetown, and Pietermaritzburg (see Map No.3).

With

the inclusion of the next most economically productive
districts of Lower Tugela and Newcastle, 74.2% of
Natal*s geographic product was accounted for.

At the

other end of the spectrum, the five districts of
Mapumulo, Ndwedwe, Ingwavuma, Mahlabatini, and Babanango produced 0.2% of the total geographic product.
Further extrapolation shows the ten most productive
districts to account for 83.6% of the total geographic
product while 0.3% is accounted for by the ten least
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Map 5 .
KwaZulu (19 75 Consolidation Proposals) and Gross Geographic Product:
Ten Magisterial Districts with lowest GGP in Natal.
(Source: R.S.A. (1974) Gross Geographic Product hv Magisterial
District, 1968. Pretoria).
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Map 6.
KwaZulu (1975 Consolidation Proposals) and Gross Geographic Product:
Ten Magisterial Districts with highest GGP in Natal.
(Source: R.S.A. (1974) Gross Geographic Product by Magisterial
District, 1968, Pretoria).
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productive districts. Maps Number's 5 and 6 illustrate
the association between geographic product and KwaZulu.

Spatial patterns of employment are intimately
related with the pattern of geographic product.

Of

all the blacks employed in Natal, only 5.32$ work in
the Durban/Pinetown and Pietermaritzburg urban cores.
The percentage of blacks employed in Natal working in
white rural areas is 19.8$ (Republic of South Africa,
1970).

Clearly, black employment is not concentrated

in the most economically productive urban cores and
those employed in the most productive rural areas are
mainly labourers on white farms.

Of all blacks in the common area * 22% are
employed in the primary sector (white owned farms and
mines, mainly); 7.4$ in the secondary sector; and
17.8$ in the tertiary sector.

Within KwaZulu, the

figures tell a different story for there 17.2$ of
blacks are engaged in the primary sector, in this case
mainly in sub-subsitence, subsistence, and very limited
'cash crop' agriculture.

Only 3.5$ of KwaZulu blacks are

employed in the secondary sector and 5.1$ in the tertiary
sector.

The latter figure contrasted with the figure of

17.8$ of common area blacks in the tertiary sector points
undoubtedly to the extent of black servant employment and
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other menial service

positions for blacks in white cities,

enterprises, and homes.

A clearer breakdown of black employment data
for Natal is provided :
BLACK EMPLOYMENT AS A PERCENTAGE OF ALL BLACKS IN NATAL
1970
Primary
Sector

Secondary Tertiary Unemployed Unspecified
Sector
Sector
£ not eccn.
active
KWAZULU

11.2

2.3

1.2

47.3

I.T

17-1

3.3
COMMON AREA

7.7

2.6

6.2

NATAL TOTAL
18.9

4.9

9.5

2.3

64.4

KWAZULU EMPLOYMENT AS A PERCENTAGE OF KWAZULU BLACKS
17.2

3.5

5-1

1.9

72.3
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Of the 64.4$ of Natal's blacks categorised as
'Unspecified and not economically active', over 70
are to be found in KwaZulu.

This phenomenon must be re-

lated to the exact nature of the South African economy
which perpetuates the system whereby KwaZulu is
characterised as a relatively unproductive rural area
whence comes the male labour in the common area.

In a recently completed thesis, Nattrass(1976)
presents her findings on black migrant labour in Natal.
Deriving her data from the 1970 census, Nattrass(1976)
estimates the numbers of blacks from rural KwaZulu
working outside of the 'homeland* to be as follows:
Table ?. Elack Migrant Labour (Source:Nattrass,1°7^:134 ,107,
137)
BLACK MIGRANT LABOUR FROM RURAL
KWAZULU, 1970
AGE

MALE MIGRANTS

t of
Age Group
34

15 - 19

42,000

20 - 24

56,000

60

25 - 29

56,000

67

30 - 34

50,000

67

35 - 39

33,000

59

40 - 44

35,000

61

45 - 49

16,000

42

50 - 54

17,000

47

55 - 64

12,000

29

317,000

52

55,000 FEMALE MIGRANTS
472,000

69

Extrapolating further, it is estimated that the
317,000 male migrants earned R132,319,000 and remitted
R25,103,000 back to KwaZulu (Nattrass, 1976:1.48).

These

remittances accounted for the eauiv»lent of 41% of
KwaZulu's gross domestic product in 1970 and 142$ of
its agricultural output (Nattrass,1976:18). Fiscal
implications of this system for rural dwellers in KwaZulu in 1970 are such that on the basis of a per capita
black family of six, it is calculated that a family with
land and one agricultural worker and one absent migrant
worker would earn R41 p.a.. A black family with no land
and one absentee worker would earn R30 p.a., and a
family with land and no absentees would earn R15 p.a..
As a contrast, the average income of an urbanised
black family would be R124 p.a. (Nattrass,197*:1*5).

These data lend credence to the simple push-pull
model of migrant labour postulated by Wilson (1972) and
display the forces which inhibit economic growth in
KwaZulu.

The skewed masculinity ratio of about 1:3

for the 19-64 years age cohort of KwaZulu residents
(Nattrass,1976:179) illustrates that most of the agricultural work in KwaZulu is in the hands of women, who
provide for the rural family in the absence of males,
whose remittances are possibly sufficient to offset
poor agricultural performances in KwaZulu.

The higher
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incomes earned by the urban blacks would most likely be
spent in the white-owned areas of the economic cores and,
together, these forces oppose the accumulation of
capital in KwaZulu.

The most recent estimate of per

capita net domestic product in KwaZulu, which includes
the white share of approximately 23$ and non-market
production such as the gathering of firewood, is R53 P-a.
(Financial Mail.11.6.1976).

3.8 Summary
The delimitation of the reserves was a consequence
of political and economic aspirations among members of
the white 'conscious collective', that is, the core.
Limited access by blacks to capital and -their subordination
on cultural grounds placed them in a-position of societal
and aconomie peripherality vis-a-vis the core. However,
the coincidence of space - economic periphery and the
peripheral social group is not absolute.

Penetration

of white interests into Natal and Zululand involved
the superimposition of white land-ownership over already
occupied territory and blacks are therefore distributed
throughout the province of Natal today.

Ideological transformations at the core consolidated
white control over state and capital and the spatial
impress of the combined demands of state and capital
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were manifest in spite of protestations by blacks.

Black employment in the white circuit of the economy binds the entire South African society into a single
economic system.

Segregation of blacks and whites, and

related patterns of industrial location, enable blacks
to participate in the industrial sector as workers only.
Traditional agricultural practices in the 'homelands',
extensive overstocking and soil erosion, and the disincentive of wage opportunities in the white areas
perpetuate low agricultural productivity in the 'homelands'.

The contemporary picture in KwaZulu is a terri-

tory restricted for black occupation only whence comes
the labour for the white core areas.

Capital is spatially

concentrated in these areas and the only access which
blacks have to that capital is as wage labourers. KwaZulu cannot, under these conditions, support its occupants
without these people being subjects of the white-controlled
capitalist circuit of production.

For the creation of

employment opportunities inside and outside KwaZulu, and
for finance capital for any agricultural or industrial
project, blacks depend on the capitalist circuit of
production.

In the next chapter, the proposed manipulation of
the territorial base of the dependent black internal colony is detailed.
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CHAPTER FOUR
TOWARD CONSOLIDATION: 1972 - 1975

4.1 Introduction
The origins of the reserves in Natal and Zululand
were noted in Chapter Three.

In this chapter the govern-

ment's proposals partially to consolidate KwaZulu are
dealt with.
during 1972.

The proposals were first officially announced
In 1975 revised proposals were announced.

Events relating to the announcement of the proposals are
chronologically accounted in the opening section of
the chapter (4.2), and in lengthy detail.

Thereafter,

a preliminary analysis of the implications of the
consolidation proposals is offered (4.3).

The reactions

of whites, with their varying degrees of allegiance to
the apartheid ideology, are then reviewed (4.4), as
are those of blacks (4.5).

The chapter is then

briefly summarised (4.6).

4.2 Government Proposals
White farmers' associations from the southern
Natal districts of Richmond, Impedle, Ixopo, Polela,
Underberg, and Umzinto were the first non-governmental
group to see details of part of the consolidation plans,
late in 1971. Early in February, 1972, the Natal
Agricultural Union (NAU), an organisation representing
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the white farmers of the province, had its Bantu
Affairs Committee meet to co-ordinate reports from
these associations on the issue of land exchanges
between white farmers and the state, and for the purpose of consolidating KwaZulu.

From the outset, the

NAU provided the intermediary link between white farmers and government, by submitting the proposals of
each to the other.

The early revelation of the plans to the NAU
was acknowledged by the Deputy Minister of Bantu Development, Mr. Raubenheimer, who a}.so stated that the NAU
had submitted counter-proposals for the Drakensberg
region.

Further consultation between his department

and the NAU was to follow and government was prepared
to allow the NAU to study the final consolidation plan
before it was made public (Financial Mail.2.f.1972).

Indications that the consolidation proposals
would be publicised during the 1972 Parliamentary
session were made by Raubenheimer in May of that
year (Daily News,10.5.1972).

Within a week the Natal

Provincial Council submitted a motion for the incorporation of East Griqualand (Map No. 1) into Natal.
This move was instigated essentially by the National
Party members of the Council (Daily News.l* & 23.5.1972).
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Although thwarted by the Executive Committee of Cape
Province, the motion reflected a desire on the part of
some white Natal politicians to consolidate white
interests and to show solidarity with the whites of
East Griaualsnd, who might become separated from the
rest of Cape Province by Transkei.

A few days later,

the NAU also appealed to the Department of Bantu
Administration and Development not to isolate white
East Griaualanders altogether by surrounding them
with 'homelands' (Daily News.27.5.1972).

This sense

of protectionism shared by the white Natal politicians
and agriculturalists stemmed from an insight into the
yet unannounced consolidation proposals.

When, in early July 1972, government consolidation proposals for northern Natal were announced,
reaction was sharper, more widespread, and somewhat
detached from the concern with the impending isolation
of white East Griqualanders.

The plan to consolidate

24 blocks and 46 black spots into four areas called for
a transfer of 530,000h» of white-owned land to KwaZulu (Daily News.6 &. 7-6.1972).

White farmers beg»n

organising a series of protest meetings.

Government temporarily appeased the situation
when, in revealing its proposals for partial consolidation
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of all of KwaZulu, it announced also that a Bantu Affairs
Commission would hold public hearings whereby whites
could air their grievances regarding the consolidation
issue.

KwaZulu would be consolidated into six areas

totalling 3,364,000ha and, according to government,
about 88,000 blacks and a few hundred whites would
face resettlement as 668,000ha of white-owned land was
exchanged for 554,000ha of black land (see Map No. 7 ) .
KwaZulu would, under these terms, receive 114,000ha of
land in addition to the quota of 1936 'because of
the difference in agricultural values of pasteral
land involved in the exchanges' (Daily News.12.*.1972).
While the whites affected by these plans would have the
limited opportunity of meeting with the Bantu Affairs
Commission as it toured Natal, the Zulu grievances would
have to be directed to the Minister of Bantu Administration
and Development in Pretoria.

White agriculturalists went ahead and convened
protest meetings.

Southern Natal farmers criticised

government for not having warned the 30 or so affected
directly by the plans (Daily News.13.6.1972).

At a

meeting in Dundee more than 100 affected white farmers
argued that white land should not be given over to
KwaZulu until the land already occupied by blacks was
used to its fullest agricultural advantage (Daily News.
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13.6.1972).

And Harding residents and local farmers

arranged to protest over the possible removal of the white
corridor between East Griqualand and the coast (Daily
News,14.6.1972) . Sugar cane and citrus farmers in the
Ntumeni district resolved to oppose the consolidation
proposals which affected farms with an annual sugar cane
production of 240,000tons (Daily News.20.*.1972).

Protestations from various quarters of the
white community became increasingly alligned with the
NAU stance, and the Union played a distinctive role
in its participation at dissentive meetings.

The

NAU president opposed the consolidation plans at a
combined Boston Farmers Association and Impendle
Agricultural Society meeting (Daily News.27.7.1972):
and at a public meeting in Eshowe, where the proposals
were again rejected, the NAU announced that if its
views on consolidation were ignored by government it
would reverse its policy of consultation with government (Daily News,19.8.1972).

By September 1972, all

but about one tenth of the white farmers* organisations
in Natal supported the NAU rejection of government
proposals (Daily News.l & 4.9.1972).

Meanwhile, other interest groups were also
lobbying against the proposals, making counter-proposals,
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or making recommendations supportive of the proposals.
The chairman of the South African Wool Grower's Association
called for a fence to be erected around KwaZulu territory to prtect white-owned stock - a recommendation
which the Deputy Minister of Bantu Development refused
to honour (Daily News.25.7 & 14.11.1972).

At an

Eshowe meeting various white farmers' associations, the
Eshowe Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the South
African Sugar Association, and the NAU proposed that
a strip of land in Reserve 21 be Incorporated into the
white area so as to widen the white corridor between
Ginginghlovu and Eshowe.

This counter-propos°l would

include the allocation of compensatory land in Reserve
11 (proposed as future white land by government) to the
5,000 affected blacks (Daily News.12.8.1972).

The

Zululand Chamber of Commerce and Industries also
rejected the official proposals, as did the Dundee Town
Council (Daily News.17.8.1972).

Claims by KwaZulu for more land met with a
firm refusal by the Minister of Bantu Administration
and Development, Mr. M.C.Botha; and the NAU received a
negative response from government in its effort to
delay the sittings of the Bantu Affairs Commission
(Daily News.8 &. 11.8.1972).

The Bantu Affairs Commission

schedule was for a September 5

hearing at Dundee, a

hearing at Eshowe the next day, a hearing at Pieter-

78

maritzburg on September 7

, and a final hearing at

Harding later that month.

At the first session at Dundee, attended by about
200 people, the chairman of the Commission stated that
the proposals should not be considered as those of
government but as coming from the Department of Bantu
Administration and Development.

The NAU made an impact

at the hearings by reiterating the opinions of white
agriculturalists and proposing that land for KwaZulu should
be taken from State land (formerly Crown land), and
not from white farmers (Daily News.5.9.1972).

The Eshowe session, attended by about 150, was
characterised by another show of disapproval for the
plans, and the southern division of the Zululand Chamber
of Commerce and Industries publicly denounced the proposals (Daily News.6.9.1972).

The Eshowe Town Council

proclaimed that local whites would rather remain in
a 'white spot* surrounded by black land than conform
with government proposals (Daily News.7.9.1972).

The next phase in the procedure 0 f planning for
consolidation followed the tour of the Bantu Affairs Commission and preceeded the report of its findings to a
Select Committee on Bantu Affairs.

As had occured

79

previously, during this phase intimations regarding
the 'final' consolidation proposals were made by government officials before the proposals were made public
in their entirety.

During March of 1973, Deputy Minister Raubenheimer announced that almost all consolidation planning
had been completed and that the 'final* plans would be
made available to the 'homeland' leaders before the
plans were presented to Parliament (Daily News.23.3.1973).
Days later, on 2f>

March, Raubenheimer met with

Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, Chief Executive Officer of
KwaZulu, and the KwaZulu Executive Council at Nongoma
to disclose the new plan which made six blocks of KwaZulu and required the displacement of about 300,000
people.

The KwaZulu delegation rejected the revised

plan (Daily News.26.3.1973).

The leader of the United Party in Natal, Mr. R.
Cadman, decried the imposition of secrecy about the
revised consolidation plans (Daily News,27.3.1973: Cadman, 1973) , but it was not until April 1973 that Raubenheimer released any further information appropos the
plans.

The Deputy Minister revealed that the Umfolozi

game reserve would, in terms of the revised plan, go to
KwaZulu (Daily News.11.4.1973) . Immediate reaction to
this statement came from the South African Council for
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Conservation and Anti-Pollution, who disapproved of
the dissection of the Hluhluwe-Umfolozi *ecosystem*
(Daily News.12.4.1973).

Raubenheimer made further

announcements at a meeting in Cedarville to the effect
that Harding would, contrary to the 1972 proposals,
have a corridor link with the Natal south coast (Daily
News,25.4.1973) . This statement received favourable
reaction from the NAU (Daily News,27.4.1973).

Alfred County Farmers* Association president
approved of the consolidation plans for the Alfred
district, which provided a corridor outlet from the
hinterland to the sea and a buffer between KwaZulu and
Transkei.

A division of the NAU was now working to

have the corridor altered so that the main road inland
from the coast would not traverse 'homeland* territory
(Daily News.12.6.1973 ).

Pronouncements by the Deputy Minister drew a
retort from the Minister of Bantu Administration and
Development who, at a press conference, said that the
Josini dam and Makatini flats below the dam would go
to KwaZulu, as would the Ndumu game reserve.

Further-

more, less than a third of the Umfolozi game reserve
would in fact go to KwaZulu.

These plans would,

according to the Minister, imply the displacement of
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133,000 blacks, an excision of 300,000ha from KwaZulu,
and an excision of 463,OOOha of white land in land
transfers (Daily News.27.4.1973)•

The NAU expressed

its satisfaction with these latest recommendations,
particularly with regard to the cession of the Josini
dam and Makatini flats to KwaZulu (Daily News.28.4.1973).

However, white agriculture responded differently
when it learnt that the two Drakensberg reserves would
remain in black hands, with additional land added
thereto.

This new information represented, to the

NAU, a reversal of earlier government assurances. In
1964, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development had agreed, in principle, to the transfer of the
two reserves to white control on the condition that
the NAU could find compensatory land for the blacks who
would have to be displaced.

The NAU h°d duly traced

white farmers in the Weenen, Colenso, and Kranskop areas
from whom such land might be bought.

It was argued by

the NAU that their concern for the Drakensberg was not
a political concern but related rather to the incapability of KwaZulu to conserve the Tugela catchment area
(Daily News.3.5.1973).

The reaction of white farmers in the Drakensberg
area motivated the NAU to send a delegation to Cape
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Town to put their case before the Parliamentary Select
Committee on Bantu Affairs on 9 t h May, 1973. The
Select Committee refused to hear the evidence of the
NAU (Daily News.5.5.1973).

Farmers in the Gourton area, near Winterton,
also dismayed by the ministerial disclosures, were
represented by their association chairman when he stated
that *At no stage could farmers be less prepared
for disaster than the Gourton farmers who have
been told for years by organised agriculture
and from ministerial level that this area
would never become a Bantustan as it is the
watershed of the Tugela* (Daily News.3.5.1973).

The

whites in Ingwavuma district and the Winterton and Bergville area farmers also protested, the latter group
castigating government for the fact that they only learnt
of the proposals, which affected them directly, indirectly through the media (Daily News.4 & 5.5.1973).

Raubenheimer indicated that he supported the
NAU opinion regarding the undesirability of having blacks
remain in the Tugela catchment area.

However, the NAU

suggestion of moving blacks from the catchment area to
the Makatini flats raised a problem, for this group of
people had tribal links with the people of the Makatini
flats (Daily News,6.10.1973)*
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Raubenheimer showed further accomodation for
the NAU when he spoke to its delegates in Pretoria.

NAU

demands that white farms be bought by government on a
block-basis, wherever this was possible, were acceded
to by Raubenheimer.

He also assured the NAU delegation

that consolidation would be completed within ten years
of the promulgation of the consolidation plans (Daily
News.28.11.1973).

At a closed meeting of nine farmers* associations
in the Estcourt, Winterton, and Bergville areas, the
provincial plans for the deproclamation of the Upper
Tugela reserve and the linking of the two Drakensberg
reserves were released.

Ninety per cent of the

farm owners rejected the plans and a committee was
elected to represent the approximately thirty affected
white farmers in opposing the plans before 18

January,

1974, the deadline before which opposition was to be
heard (Daily News.12 & 14.12.1973).

Early in January, 1974, parts of Natal owned
by whites in the Durban, Lower Umfclozi, and Eshowe
magisterial districts were declared released areas
available for purchase by the Bantu Trust (Daily News.
11.1.1974).
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In March, 1974, Raubenheimer- announced that the
KwaZulu consolidation plans were still incomplete, with
the future of the controversial flats undecided.

He also

suggested that the future of Eshowe as a white town was
in the balance (Daily News.20.3.1974).

The resultant

upcry drew a comment from Prof. O.P.F.Horwood, the Minister of Indian Affairs and Tourism, that Eshowe would
remain a white town (Daily News.28.3.1974).

Neverthe-

less, a deputation from the Eshowe Town Council went
to Pretoria where they received Raubenheimer's assurance
on their continuing control of Eshowe (Daily News.9.4.1974).

At the end of March, 1975, the consolidation
proposals were disclosed in part in the media and on
2

May, 1975, the Parliamentary Select Committee on

Bantu Affairs had its proposals approved in the House
of Assembly

(see Map lio. 7 ) .

4 «3 Behind and Beyond the Consolidation Plans
Parliamentary procedure shadowing the developments discussed above began with the establishment of
Bantu Affairs Commission whose plans for consolidation
were examined and revised by a Parliamentary Select
Committee on Bantu Affairs (Republic of South Africa,
1975).

Some of the revised plans received parliament-

ary approval in 1973 and, after amendments, the rest of
the proposals were approved and adopted in 1975.
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Debated at length in Parliament, the consolidation
issue magnified existing cleavages between the three white
political parties represent i in Parliament at the time.
In mid-May, 1975, when the final reports were being
considered, government policy on land allocation was
reiteraw .d in respect of the 1936 quotas.

Reaction

from opposition benches was strong, and reference to
the 1936 Act was a point of contention for it was seen
to be utilised merely to rationalise apartheid (Hansard.
May 1975; 4 &. 5.6.1975).

It was revealed in Parliament that the Select
Committee based its reports on the un-recorded evidence
of the Bantu Affairs Commission.

Furthermore, at no

stage were the victims of the removals (blacks), which
would ensue from consolidation, ever consulted.

Leaders

of the *homeland' administrative bodies were consulted
only on an ad hoc basis by a few of the members of
the Select Committee, belonging to the opposition
United Party (Hansard.14.5.1975; 4&5.6.1975).

The economic and social ramifications of the
Parliamentarily-approved recommendations of the Select
Committee (Republic of South Africa, 1975) demand
some attention.

In the first instance, the proposals

organise white territory so as to provide for an
almost completely integrated area with accessibility among
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p-->rts and cities in Natal and the hinterland provinces
of Transvaal and Orange Free State.

A white corridor

extending northward from Durban links this city with
Richards Bay, whence extend corridors to Swaziland in the
north and Transvaal in the north-west.

The Richards

Bay - Vryheid passage is significant in the light of
Richards Bay*s development as a port.

Although the

major rail and road routes between these two towns
will pass through KwaZulu, at Ulundi, the Richards Bay
site will be conveniently linked with the Witwatersrand by a white passage.

The white town of Eshowe is

accorded access to this passage in the most recent
proposals.

Eastward from Dturban, the arterial trans-

portation route to the Witwatersrand is also straddled
by white territory, as it passes via Pietermaritzburg
and the northern Natal industrial complexes at Ladysmith
ar.d Newcastle (Republic of South Africa, 1975).

Social disruption in consequence of the implementation of the plans would be characterised by the
resettlement of hundreds of thousands of blacks.
Resettlement has received some attention in the literature
(Desmond,1971; Baldwin,1975).

Thus far, most resettle-

ment has involved the removal of blacks from black spots
to 'homeland* areas.

The scale of resettlement would be

augmented by the excision of larger reserves from KwaZulu in efforts at consolidation.

Furthermore, the
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proposed elimination of the labour tenant system,
which has survived since colonial times, would affect
an estimated 400,000 blacks (Horrell,1973).

Selection of land in providing for additional
territory and alternative territory to that excised
from KwaZulu favoured the granting to KwaZulu of State
land before white farmlands.

This is noted in respect

of the Makatini flats (including the Ndumu game reserve),
and the Ngoya and Nkandla forest reserves.

Towns now

embraced by KwaZulu would be Impendle, Hlabisa, Nongoma,
Ubombo, Ingwavuma, and Pomeroy, all minor service
centres.

Territory excised from KwaZulu included the
Upper Tugela reserves in the Bergville district and
only small portions of the Drakensberg reserves contested by the NAU.

A more detailed perspective on the

implications of the proposals is furnished in the next
chapter.

4.4 Consolidation and the Core
Critiques of the consolidation proposals have
come from various quarters at the core.

Beside crit-

icism from persons closely allied with the ruling
party in South Africa, opposition has come too from
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other influential parties such as organised white
agriculture in Natal.

Commenting on consolidation, the

NAU raised the following question : 'Can anyone
seriously envisage the effects of, say 1,000
white Natal farmers, walking off highly capitalised,
developed farms, with their knowledge, expertise and capital so that this land can be handed
over to peasant farmers to practice subsistence
farming, under communal land ownership?' (NAUNT.U. Nov, 19°*).

The English-language press, reputed for its
constant attacks on the current regime, has taken issue
with government over the consolidation proposals.
Two examples of editorial stances on the "proposals follow.
One Durban daily argued that 'V-hite and Black
have always, and will always, be utterly
dependent on each other. Drawing lines on the
map won't change that. The wealthy and the
impoverished have never been good neighbours
and the geographical nightmare which has now
been concocted will perpetuate the stark
difference. It holds the recipe for future
friction, discontent and bitterness' (Daily News.
30.4.1973).

The other Durban daily perceived the proposals
in a similar light : 'Experience has shown that
few things are as un-final as the Government's
protracted series of "final" proposals for
the consolidation of KwaZulu - or to be more
accurate, the fragmentation of Natal...the only
sensible course (failing an "entirely new geopolitical dispensation") is to start planning
the whole province on the assumption that its
various regions are going to function as a
single economic unit, whatever the ultimate
political configuration' (Natal Mercury.1.4.1975).
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Within South Africa's party-political structure,
the two major parties representing opponents of government among the all-white electorate in 1975 both proposed federal solutions to South Africa's territorial
ailemma.

The United Party stood for a race federation

which would ensure white supremacy but not be based
necessarily on territorial segregation.

The Progressive

Party solution would be based on a qualified franchise
system for voters.

Essentially, both parties rejected

the consolidation proposals as irrelevant to their policies for they both rejected the idea of sovereign
states being established within South Africa.

A number of academics have been involved in
the debate too (Rest and Young,1972b;de Glercqjl973;
Maasdorp,1976; Blenck and von der Ropp,197*).

These

involvements have not gone unnoticed by parliamentarians,
particularly the analysis of alternative consolidation
strategies made by Best and Young(1972b)which received
mention in a House of Assembly debate (Hansard.5.6.1973).
de Clercq(1973) extends the former analysis and Maasdorp
(1976) argues for more land to be given to KwaZulu.

The

paper by Blenck and von der Ropp(197*) represents an
insensitive analysis of the situation, reminiscent of
missionary strategy during the infusion of western European ideology into the colonial empires.
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The critiques of four core elites sympathetic
to apartheid are now discussed.

Any action by govern-

ment in relation to the spatial organisation of
economy and society must be closely monitored, and
these influential critiques should not be ignored,
future policy under this or another regime will be
based upon the emergent patterns in the South African
space economy which are rooted in the ideologies of
the core.

The South African Bureau for Racial Affairs (SABRA),
an organisation of Afrikaner intellectuals and academics,
has had an intimate association with the development
of apartheid.

Contributions to its periodical publications

epitomise apartheid ideology and the SABRA is also
active in promoting cultural awareness among white,
predominantly Afrikaner, youth by organising youth
camps and the like.

One paper read before the SABRA 1976 annual
convention received wide publicity in the South African
media, including mention in a news broadcast of the
recently installed SABC TV network.

The paper, presented

by Bruinette(1976), dealt with the question of consolidation in the broader context of the implementation
of apartheid, and its salient features are notable.
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Bruinette(1976) traces the precedents of the
current stage of apartheid and justifies its existence
in his observation that the western-capitalist-democratic
model is ideal for whites, who have been acquainted
with it for centuries, while blacks have only known it
for decades.

That is, argues Bruinette(1976), a pol-

itical model for blacks which has stood the test of
time is unknown in moderb times and without major
modifications the existing white model seems not to be
the relevant alternative for blacks.

According to Bruinette(1976), the political
system in South Africa makes for a state with more
foreigners (i.e. blacks) than 'South Africans'.

Coupling

this phenomenon with the idea that the present pattern
of minority versus majority in the country is unprecedented
in history, the current political model can only be
accepted by Bruinette(197£) as a non-permanent, transitory phase.

A twenty-year task of border redefinition,

population removals and resettlements, and great
economic cost will provide the basis for the ultimate
phase, where the majority of 'South Africans' will be
white.

To this end, he argued, the governmental consolidation proposals are unsatisfactory, from the
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perspective of defense and b*»eatise of the multitude
of corridors and fragmented tracts of white land.
The solution lies for him in the delimitation of four
territorial blocks which would accomodate blacks and
thereby leave South Africa a white domain, while
allowing blacks to develop their own nations.

KwaZulu

would constitute a block in this scheme, along with
the Ciskei-Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and North East
Transvaal blocks.

Implications of the scheme include, inter alia,
the withdrawal of the 1936 Act, the transaction of land
between white and black on an exchange basis, the provision
for existing landowners to retain propriety over land
and become citizens of another state as prescribed by
border changes, the condition that all land not exchanged
on a mutual basis must be paid for by the respective
states even if it takes the 'homelands' a long time to
do so, and, the necessity of expert management to study
and monitor the interventionism required to implement
the scheme (the SABRA has a committee to do this),

To facilitate commuting by blacks to white urban
centres, suggests Bruinette(1976), the existing 'homelands' need to be expanded in the direction of these
centres.

Blacks working in the white cities should be
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subjected to the obtaining system of discrimination in
employment.

Furthermore, ethnic integration among

blacks is to be prevented by allocating different tribal
groupings to different work zones (e.g. Zulus should
work only in Natal).

This is important for Bruinette(1976)

because he holds that integration disintegrates the
roots of national identity and culture, and a black mass
is cultivated, without any cohesive national identity and
without the security necessary for peaceful evolution.

The KwaZulu block, maintains Bruinette(1976),
should be in northern Natal and consolidated so as
to join Swaziland and the Swazi 'homeland*.

Ilammersdale

and Umlazi present problems for him and blacks should
be moved about 20km north to be in KwaZulu.

Newcastle

is seen to be ideally located and the part of KwaZulu
near there could be consolidated eastward to adjoin
the rest of KwaZulu.

Richards Bay and northern Natal

will ultimately fall within KwaZulu and the areas of
the *homeland* now between the Durban - Pietermaritzburg Newcastle line and Transkei must be exchanged for that
land.

The exigencies of the dynamic state of race relations in South Africa and the concern for the preservation
of cultural exclusivity at the white core are clear
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instigators of the above critique, symbolising as it
does the basic tenets of apartheid ideology.

In the next

critique similar concerns, although perhaps slightly
less evident, are compounded by concern for the
preservation of a capitalist mode of production in
South Africa.

The stated aim of the Bantu Investment Corporation is *...to bring about, maintain and further
economic viability in the Homelands* (Bantu Investment
Corporation,1976:3 ).

Engaged as it is in fostering

investment in the *homelands*, the BIC constitutes the
primary instrument for the rationalisation of apartheid
on economic grounds.

Speaking at a recent meeting of the Associated
Chambers of Commerce in Port Elizabeth, the chairman
of the BIC board of directors addressed the issue of
political and economic decentralisation in South Africa.
Viljoen(1976) emphasises that his speech is a personal
rather than an official statement.

This declaration

cannot but reinforce the need to heed his opinions,
which are critical of political structures in South
Africa as well as of government*s consolidation proposals
for the 'homelands*.

The speech by Viljoen(197*)

represents another voice of dissent among the elite
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proponents of apartheid.

Observations made by Viljoen(197*) at the
outset of his talk relate to the ideal of maintaining
in South Africa a 'favourable investment climate' for
the realisation of South Africa's full economic potential.
Internal strife could interfere with the attainment of
this ideal and 'evolutionary outlets* must be provided
to obviate conflict.

That is, non-whites, who will

constitute an increasingly large proportion of the
country*s population, with corresponding increases in
their urbanisation and participation in industrialisation,
'...will become better educated and more conscious of
their place and role in our society' (Viljoen,1976).
These people will have to be provided with employment
opportunities and rates of pay commensurate with their
abilities and they should have an increasing share in
governmental decision-making, within a federal structure
of government.

Viljoen(1976) sees three impediments to the
actualisation of decentralisation in the 'homelands* :
The problem of activating blacks *...to become a profitorientated society so that it can run a modern sophisticated economy...*(Viljoen,1976) over a short period;
the faot that most of the income of the *homelands * is
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earned by migrant workers; and, the fragmentation of
the *homelands'.

Following Malherbe( 1974 )"', Viljoen(197* ) proposes the consolidation of KwaZulu between the Tugela
and Pongola rivers.

However, Richards Bay would not

go to the state of KwaZulu.

Instead, Viljoen(197*)

advocates the establishment of a condominium over
Richards Bay and Empangeni by KwaZulu, Natal Province
(which would no doubt have a white government), and the
central (federal) government.

The Richards Bay-Empangeni

complex would become a demilitarised zone so that none
of the above governments could use Richards Bay to
import or export arms and troops.

Another viewpoint is held by a former member
of the Tomlinson Commission, Moolman(1974;1975), who
is now a member of the Africa Institute , an ostensibly
impartial research organisation.

Moolman(1974),

speaking at a South African Institute of Race Relations
annual council meeting, presented his view as a solution
(to the territorial problem in South Africa) somewhere
between the SABRA and SAIRR policies. Moolman(1974;
1975) demonstrates how blacks have not experienced the
same degree of political, ethnic, economic, and territorial
consolidation as whites have.
(* reviewed by Young{1975)).

It is not until these
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interests are realised among blacks that consolidation
can be said to be effective.

Just as in the previous critiaues, Moolman(1974;
1975) is only seeking an alternative within the apartheid
structure.

All three of the above critiques call in

fact for the drawing together of the existing peripheral
group within a unified territorial base.

Taking *homeland* policy for granted, Dr. L.McCrystal, an economist preparing a *development* plan
for KwaZulu, claims that 'We have a chance here
to demonstrate how the development of underdeveloped areas can be promoted to the benefit
of the entire community both developed and
underdeveloped' (South African Digest.25.3.1977).
Advocating a capital investment of R400 million in the
next seven years and the development of a transportation
infrastructure to connect the parts of KwaZulu, McCrystal
sees the remedy to the problems cf KwaZulu in achieving
a growth in KwaZulu's geographic product of 10% at
constant prices (South African Digest.25.3.1977).

4 .5 Consolidation and the Periphery
This section deals with black reaction tc
the spatial impact of state and capital in Natal between
197? and 1975.

It should be noted that the ouestion

of land-claims is considered in Chapter * as beinf
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ciccndary to the greater problem of internal cclorialism
in South Africa.

Most recent land-claims came from office bearers
of the KwaZulu executive Council at the time c r the
announcement of the consolidation plans.

These people

are not regarded by all blacks a<b leaders, it should
be remembered.

Buthelezi, the officially recognised

I-waZulu leader, has been dubbed in the past as a
reactirrTy misleader of blacks (Daily News, 12.7.1973 ).
This statement frcm the Black Peoples' Convention is
not an uncommon one ascribed to black administrators in
KvaZulu.

Nevertheless, their views are significant

for, at the time of the consolidation proposal
announcements they were the only blacks to become
imbued in the land debate. (3-e Append" iv -.)

Apartheid and the consolidation proposals came
under heavy attack by Puthelezi and other members of
his government.

Also, the proposed removals of blacks

drev; angry comment from other blacks in KwaZulu.

Puth-

elezi has stated, for example, that 'Any solution
worked out by whites on their own will never give us
satisfaction' (Daily News.2.3.1973) and that 'The
urban areas are blossoming because of the brawn
of the Black man. Now that the time has come
for the tree we have tended together to blossom,
they want to claim it for themselves. This is
why they hold pseudo-independence before our
eyes' (Daily News.12.3.1973).
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On the question of consolidation, Buthelezi
has repeatedly asked Prime Minister Vorster for more
land to be added to KwaZulu (SAIRR,197*; Daily News.
23.1.1975)and the KwaZulu government has also laid
claim to Richards Pay, all the Zululand n m e reserves,
and State land in Zululand north of the Tugela river
(Daily News,17.1.1973) and the Zululand coast and
territorial waters (Daily News.25.3.1974).

The issue of resettlement has drawn particularly sharp commentary from blacks. Mr. B.Dladla,
the KwaZulu Executive Councillor of Community Affairs,
announced that only the barrel of a gun would mo\e
blacks from the Drakensberg and Tugela reserves (Daily
News,*.6.1973), and chiefs and headmen in the Drakensberg reserves have stated also that they would refuse
to move even under penalty of death (Daily News.#.*.1973).

More recently, Buthelezi has directed his
attention to the question of black subjugation in general rather than to the land question.

He has received

wide publicity for- a number of public speeches in the
past twc vears in which he criticised the apartheid
regime.

Calling for an elimination of apartheid and

for the establishment of multi-racial government in
South Africa, Buthelezi stated at a meeting with white
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politicians that 'The choice for South Africa is clear abandon apartheid or forego the co-operation of
blacks' (Natal Mercury.6.12.1976).

Buthelezi has also recently conferred with
other 'homeland' leaders and a ioint statement was
irsued to the white central government.

A resolution

therefrom follows : 'The leaders here assembled,
excluding Bophutatswana and the Transkei,
wish to reiterate that they have no intention
whatsoever of opting for the so-called independence, as we do not want-t© abdicate our birthright as South Africans, as well as forfeiting
our share of the economy and wealth, which we
have jointly built' (Africa Report.Sep-OctrlQ7*)«

The core is taking increasing notice of such
statements for the threat to its si rvival (and it is
a growing threat) has perhaps never been as great as
in the last year.

4-6 Summary
This chapter has outlined the spatial impact
of state ard capital in Natal becween 1972 and 197r
and has pointed to white critiques thereof and to the
voices of black opposition oc th3 consolidation pla^s.

At the core thera is dissatisfaction *--"th "he
consolidation proposals.

However, the most potentially

influential opponents do not question the notions of
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*homeland' development or segregation of th^ races.
Their concern is with the methods of segregation,
and their counter-proposals will not go unheeded by
government.

Confusion surrounding the announcement of the
consolidation proposals heightened ci'iticism from the
whites most immediately affected by tbe plans. A
marked susceptibility by government to the com^ent^
cf white owners of capital is recognisable throughout
the 1972 - 1975 period.

Black reaction to the consolidation proposals
was at first extremely critical.

The relationship

between the periphery and the core has become increasingly strained and blacks are now placing more
emphasis on the socio-political structure of internal
colonialism than en its territorial base.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONSOLIDATION IN THE BALANCE

5 .1 Introduction
Apartheid in general, and the consolidation proposals in particular, have wrought, or may give rise to,
a scheme of things which have thus far in this dissertation
been described in mainly non-evaluative terms.

In this

chapter a selection of problems associated with the
methods of apartheid under study are pinpointed and an
evaluation of each is advanced.

Initially, the implications

of the consolidation plans for population removals are
considered (5.2).

The next area of concern is the pattern

of urbanisation of blacks in Natal and industrial sation,
as they relate to state planning(5.3).

Two location-

specific problems are then identified.

Richards Bay

is considered in view of its envisaged development as
a port (5.4), and the rationale behind land allocation
in the Tongaland region (Ingwavuma district) is questioned
(5.5).

The concluding section (5-6) summarises the

chapter.

5 .2 Consolidation and Removals
KwaZulu's territorial consolidation will be
accompanied by mass removals of people from areas deproclaimed for their ethnic or racial group. Desmond
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(1971) has detailed the mental and physical impact of
the removals upon the black victims in a provocative
work emanating from years of intimate familiarity with
*the discarded people' (as he calls them) encumbered by
resettlement.

The anguish of being uprooted in comp-

liance with policies devised solely by the white core
is, for blacks, the most glaring and alarming social
consequence of the issue of *homeland* consolidation.

The process of resettlement has been going on
since the delimitation of the first reserves in Natal.
de Clercq (1973) suggests that approximately #00,000
blacks were relocated in reserves in colonial Natal.
Since 1.94& momentum has gathered and resettlement has
embraced a broader spectrum of the population.

In

terms of present policy, not only blacks are being
removed, but also members of other groups. Furthermore, the nature of black resettlement has taken on
larger proportions with the official attempts at
eliminating black spots and with the outlawing of
labour tenants and squatters on white farms.

It is estimated that in 194# there were ?42
black spots in Natal, carrying a population of *7,100,
and that by 1964 there were 199 black spots with
35,200 black occupants (Maasdorp,1970). The largest
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complex of resettlement areas absorbing resettled
blacks in the 1960*s and early 1970's was in the Tugela
Basin between Dundee and Weenen (Maasdorp,1970).

By the beginning of 1972 there remained more
than 100 black spots in Natal (Financial Mail.21.1.1972).
During 1972, about 225 families were moved from a
farm (black spot) near Waschbank to Ekuvukeni in the
Limehill area, about 29km away (SAIRR,.1973)- M«re
than 400 black families from Hobsland and Vulandondo
were removed to Ezakheni, those from Hobsland having
been resettled there in 19*3 and promised permanancy of
residence (SAIRR,1973).

The 1972 consolidation

proposals placed the resettlement figures at approximately 343,000 blacks, £,4#0 Indians, 1,060 Coloureds,
and 6,160 whites in Natal (Young,B.S., quoted in Daily
News.5.6.1973).

A recent estimate, which includes all forms of
displacement, has it that 105,000 blacks will ultimately
be moved in Natal (Baldwin,1975).

5.3 Regional Policy. Urbanisation, and Industrialisation
What one pair of writers expose in South Africa
as a case of 'contained urbanisation' (Fair and Schmidt,
1974), another pair refer to as 'a mechanically strange
regional policy' (Mabin and Biesheuvel,1975), Regional
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policy in South Africa is dictated by anartheid ideology
and revolves around the linked issues of 'contained
urbanisation' and industrial decentralisation.

As

originally rationalised by Dr. H.F.Verwoerd (cf 3.4),
regional policy strives to restrict the flow of blacks
to existinu cities and, by means of incentives, to
encourage manufacturing industry, which is mostly
privately owned, to locate adjacent to or inside the
'homelands'.

The constraints upon black urbanisation,
namely '...the myriad regulations commonly referred to
as "the pass laws" (by which) legal residence or continuous employment for specified periods, or since birth,
in the relevant city or town' (Mabin and Biesheuvel,1975),
are incompatible with the pressure of negligible
opportunities for wage-employment in the 'homelands' and
demand for unskilled and semi-skilled labour in the
industrial centres.

The attempted enticement cf

private industry to locate in the 'homelands' is not
as successful as necessary to counter the impulses
behind labour migrancy.

Far more successful has been

the removal of blacks from certain areas and the manipulation of borders so as to bring parts of the 'homelands' within commuting distance of industrial centres
in white-owned territory, which have or have net been
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proclaimed as zones for decentralised industry.

In any study of urbanisation in South Africa,
twc types of urban area need to be recognised.

On the

one hand thare is urbanisation in the cities which
existed before active decentralisation policies were
pursued by government, and on the other hand are the
emergent industrial centres which are manifestations of
decentralisation policy or which are new cities designated as decentralised areas.

In the case of Natal,

Durban and Newcastle may be taken as representatives
of the first mentioned class of city, while Isithebe,
Hammersdale, and Richards Bay might be subsumed under the
latter class.

The drawing of the above distinction calls for
a diversion into the taxonomy of planning.

The concepts

growth centre and growth pole have been distinguished
in terms of a hierarchy of central places (Allen and
Hermansen,1968*; Misra,1969; Fair; 1973); or as regions
in geographic space or as loci in abstract economic
space (Hermansen,1972; Campbell,1974).

Elsewhere,

growth poles have been conceptualised as regional
development planning tools (Thomas,1972); hypotheses
(Parr,19*5); or theories (Misra,1969) - in the last case
assuming predictive and explanatory powers.

Campbell
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(1974) offers simplification by proposing that '...the
term growth pole hould be confined to polarization nd growth processes in ecoromic space,
and the term growth center should be confined
to concentration and growth processes in geographic
space' (Campbell,1974).

Ambiguities in the theory surrounding the
concepts are magnified by official nomenclature in
South Africa.

The South African National Physical

Development Plan (Republic of South Africa,1975 h )
defines growth poles as '...towns cr complexes of
towns which will, without much stimulus, command sufficient growth potential to develop
and support a large population. These poles
should be far enough from existing metropolitan
areas to develop into independent cities in
the future' (Republic of South Africa,1975 b:l#).
State planning also fosters 'growth points' within or
in close proximity to the 'homelands'.

The Durban-Pinetown-Pietermaritzburg complex is
classified as one of four metropolitan areas by the
National Physical Development Plan (Republic of South
Africa,1975 b ). Planning within that area, the
Natal To wn and Regional Planning Commission (NTRPC)
enumerate the 1970 population thereof as almost two
million of Natal's four and a quarter million total
population (NTRPC,1973).

Metropolitan Durban alone

had a population of over 900,000 in 19**, of whom
over one third were blacks (NTRPC,1973).

Projections

suggest that the proportion of blacks will increase
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given the present rates of growth and migration.
DURBAN : POPULATION FORECAST
1966
1980
1990
250,390
384,900
527,700

Whites

Asians &, Coloureds335 ,278

528,400

705,300

Blacks

350,024

509,930

729,180

TOTAL

935,692 1,423,230 1,9*2,180

Ta':le 3.

Durban : Population Forecast
(Source:WTRrC,1973 Appendix 2, Table h)

A similar projection of employment numbers suggests that
by 1990 almost one half of the envisaged 935,851 people
employed in Durban will be blacks (NTRPC,1973).

The extent and dynamics of black participation
in the regional economy of the Durban-Pinetown-Pietermaritzburg area point to the inextricability of black
and white in the economic sphere.

Industrial concentration

about the port of Durban and associated tertiary development requires a concentration of workers and a dilemma
arises for the segregationist government.

Blacks are

vital to the capitalist circuit of production, yet the
need is seen to separate them from their places of
work by a distance commensurate with the dictates of
apartheid.

Umlazi and KwaMashu, black residential areas
within the Durban-Pinetown metropolis, have been
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incorporated into KwaZulu, the former having been one of
the colonial reserves and the latter by border manipulation.
Likewise, in the case of Newcastle decentralisation
planning took into account local industrial expansion,
particularly the erection of the third fully integrated
steelworks in South Africa.

Madadeni township for

blackp is adjacent to Newcastle's industrial area and
Osizweni is being developed 7.4km east of Madadeni
(Newcastle Municipality,n.d.).

Sundumbili is the only residential area designated for black workers in decentralised industries
in KwaZulu, at Isithebe.

Other black townships in

areas of industrial decentralisation are Empumalangst,
near Hammersdale, and Ezikhaweni, near Richards Bay.
Being outside KwaZulu, Hammersdale and Richards Bay
serve only as employment sources for blacks and duplicate
therefore the state of affairs in Durban and Newcastle,
where maximum capital investment occurs in the white
zones of the urban-industrial areas and thus where
returns to capital are directed.

Strong appeals have been made by the BIC to
foreign investors to locate plants in the 'homelands*.
The participation of trans-national corporations in
the development of SouthAfrica*s capitalist circuit of

111

production based on black labour notwithstanding,
certain foreign investors have been attracted to
KwaZulu1.

The indirect shareholdings of British

investors in Isithebe firms (Financial Mail,12.7.1974)
and the decision of a Swiss industrialist to establish
a Rl million plant in KwaZulu (SAIRR,1974) are noteworthy.
Also of interest is the investment of Bata Shoe Company
in two KwaZulu plants.

A R2 million factory to be

opened near Estcourt in 1978 will bring the Bata investment to R3 million.

The existing Bata factory at

Keates Drift near Greytown employs 230 Zulus (Natal
Mercury.12.11.1976).

KwaZulu may well attract further

foreign capitalists which would steer returns to capital
directly out of South Africa, rather than having the
social product polarise in the South African cities.
That is, the structure of the dependency of the black
internal colony would face transformation but not
destruction.

It is apparent that black urbanisation focuses
on the major urban-industrial cores, and government's
vision of industrial decentralisation as a means cf
constraining the influx of blacks in the larger cities
remains unrealised (Fair and Davies, 1976).

Growth pole

or growth centre theory may be applied to the ends of
social justice by decentralising industry (Santos,
1975 a ). However, industrial decentralisation in
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South Africa works to the ultimate benefit of the
white core and foreign investors because the industries
involved are dominated by interests at the core.

Should KwaZulu become * independent', its
administrators would find it difficult to restrain
urbanisation, in the event that they revoked all the
laws currently inhibiting black mobility.

As it is,

Maasdorp(1975) estimates the number of squatters to be
about a quarter million in the Durban area alone . An
obvious solution to the problem, it would seem, would
be to encourage exactly the type of decentralisation
that government is now trying to promote.

This would

run contrary to the suggestions made by Young(1972)
and Maasdorp(1974) for industrial development to be
initiated in KwaZulu at locations adjoining the
existing industrial areas.

In the final analysis, it may be said that the
maintenance of the urban-industrial cores and their
contributions to the successful functioning of the
capitalist circuit of production in South Africa (and
in its international setting) rely absolutely on
black labour.

Any decentralisation attempts and even

the question of an 'independent' KwaZulu need to be
weighed against this fact.

Solutions to the problem of
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black urbanisation and industrial decentralisation rest
in the relationship between workers and industry.

Equity

in terms of opportunity and mobility among all participants in the South African economy is a precondition
for the solution of these problems.

Another precon-

dition relates to the control of capital flows within
the economy, both locally and internationally.

Industrial

decentralisation is a meaningless task until these
issues are addressed and settled.

5.4 Consolidation and Richards Bay(see Map No.S )
Selected by central government as the site
for a deep-water port in 1965 (Financial Mail.31.7.1970).
Richards Bay is being transformed from a nature reserve
and fishing resort into a harbour city which is to
perform various functions within the South African
space economy and within the framework of international
patterns of trade.

The port was opened to limited

shipping traffic in April,1976, with the primary
purpose of serving as a point of trans-shipment for
the bulk exportation of coal and, later, other bulk
cargo such as sugar.

The port and its corresponding city are planned
to fulfil national and international economic imperatives rather than cater for clearly discernable social
needs.

This accords with the trend in the evolution
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of other cities in South Africa (cf Anderson,1958),
namely the almost invariable association of industrial
concentration and urban growth with natural resource
location (An exception would be the creation of a new
town primarily to fulfil political imperatives; e.g.
Ulundi - cf Best and Young, 1972 a ).

Besides offering deep-water port facilities
and alleviating traffic at Durban, presently the main
port serving Natal and parts of the Witwatersrand,
Richards Bay will act as an industrial growth point
drawing labour from KwaZulu (Republic of South Africa,
1972).

At the national level then, Richards Bay is

planned as a metropolitan port and point of origin for
a 'development axis' to the Witbank/Middleburg coalmining and industrial complex in the Transvaal (Republic
of South Africa,1975 b ).

At the local level, urban planning for the new
city progresses according to the master plan drawn by
a private firm, Thorringtcn-Smith, Rosenberg, and
McCrystal, at the behest of government.

Government has

exercised maximum possible control over developments
at Richards Bay by 'freezing' most of the land in the
vicinity, much of which was appropriated through compensation from farmers and other private groups and
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individuals, enabling the planners to begin with a
'clean slate'.

Map 8.

Richards Bay

Industrialisation began when the Alusaf
aluminium smelter was established at Richards Bay through
state enterprise.

Production began in 1971, providing

the main materials for overhead cable manufacturer,
Alcor, with its plant at the Alton industrial park
at Richards Bay.

Under a twenty-year contract,

Alusaf buys its alumina from Gove in the Northern
Territory of Australia.

Beside such linkage effects

116

with Alusaf, it is expected by state planners that
more industries will be attracted to Richards Bay by
government's growth point concessions to industrialists
locating there (Daily News.4.2.1971: Financial Mail.
17.1.1975).

A major private industrial plant to have
located at Richards Bay is owned by Triomf Fertilizer
Investments and produces phosphoric acid.

Deliveries

have already been made to Brazil and a ten-year contract has been negotiated for the supply of 50,000tons
of phosphoric acid to Japan (South African Digest.18.3.1977)^.

As previously alluded to, all planning has
conformed to the principles of apartheid and residential areas are devised to maintain racial segregation,
and this by means of a physical barrier. Ezikhaweni,
the black residential area (designated on the accompanying
map as reserve nc". 10), lies south west of the bay
and will provide the bulk of the labour required by
industries located four or more kilometres across the
flood plain of the Mhlatuzi river.

The area designated

reserve no. 4, on the other hand, is subject to redesignation according to the most recently announced
consolidation plans and will ultimately fall under
white ownership.
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At this stage, mention should be made cf a
coastal mining operation in reserve no. 4, 7km north of
Richards Bay.

The deposit of heavy mineral-bearing

sand in the coastal dunes will yield an assortment of
minerals totalling 700megatons by 1980 (Financial
Mail,30.7.1976)*\

The Bantu Mining Corporation will

receive 10$ of profits from the operation.

The

Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa,
Union Corporation, Quebec Iron and Titanium Corporation
of Canada, and the Old Mutual will share the balance
of the profits, with the Canadian concern receiving
3*£ of the total profits (Financial Mail.30.7.197*).
Canpdian involvement is intensified by the R12C million
loan put up by 12 Canadian banks toward the R250 million
project (Financial Mail.30.7.1976).

A smelter is

being constructed outside KwaZulu to serve the mining
operation and will commence operation in 1978 (Financial
Mail,30.7.1976).

Indications are that the largest proportion of
benefits to be derived from Richards Bay will accrue
to the private proprietors of industry and commerce,
to the state, and to foreign investors.

Conclusions

of this kind appear contrary to the ideals of Richards
Bay's planners as expressed in the following passage:
'There are Bantu Homelands in the vicinity
of the Bay, and the area therefore lends itself
to development in accordance with the Govern-
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ment's policy of Separate Development,
whereby industrial employment areas are established at the interface of White Areas and
Bantu Homelands, so that White and Black can
benefit economically from modern technology,
but can live in their own areas administered
by themselves in accordance with their own
culture and customs* (Thorrington-Smith,n.d.).

Naive or obfuscatory, whichever epithet is
attached to this rationalisation for the means of
exploiting Richards Bay, the fact that wealth generated
by the new city will find its way to the white-owned
cores of capital concentration within South Africa
and in foreign economic cores cannot be concealed.
While the level of social well-being among blacks is
dependent upon development in the economic cores
(given the capitalist mode of production), that level
is also curtailed by the extent to which wealth
polarises in non-black areas in South Africa or
outside the country.

Richards Bay was part of Zululand appropriated
by white interests during the phase of territorial
fragmentation at the beginning of this century.

The

interests of state and capital today further alienate
Richards Bay from the Zulu people.

This is evidenced

in the manner in which the consolidation proposals
manipulate KwaZulu*s borders to suit forseeable growth
at Richards Bay, and in the way by which returns to
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capital are channeled to the non-Zulu investors in
local development.

The consolidation proposals clearly

provide access routes between Richards Bay and the
Witwatersrand, and also for the excision of reserve no.4.
The motives for these particular provisions in the
latest consolidation plans relate directly to the fused
ideologies of apartheid and capitalism in South Africa.

5.5 Consolidation and Tongaland
The Tongaland block of KwaZulu (see Maps No's.
1 and 3.

The block coincides roughly with Ingwavuma

magisterial district) comprises the north-eastern
region of Natal, which embraces Tongaland and shares
some of its border with the states of Swaziland and
Mocambique.

Recently, in compliance with the conditions

cf the 1936 Bantu Land and Trust Act, this peripheral
region was designated as one of ten blocks of land
constituting KwaZulu.

More recently still, on 25 t h

June 1975, Mocambique achieved independence after
centuries of domination by metropolitan Portugal.
The new regime in Mocambique governs in accordance
with an ideology vigorously antithetical to that of
the South African government and the border common tc
both states is thus a distinct barrier in politicalspace, separating two incompatible political systems.
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In the interim between the two abovementioned
manifestations of ideological assiduity, in South Africa
and in Mozambique, lives were lost in the west of the
region during inter-clan fighting over rights to domestic
leadership (Daily News.3.9.1974; Natal Mercury.13.9 &
4.10.1974; Daily News.4.10.1974 ).

Cognisance was taken

of the dispute by Swaziland officials (one clan mounted
its offensive from Swaziland after moving there from
Ingwavuma), and they reiterated their claims to the
western part of the Ingwavuma district (Daily News.3.9.1974).
The Tongaland block represents a potential zone of
conflict.

The western border of the Tongaland block
coincides with the Ubombo mountains. In 1868 the Transvaal Republic annexed Swaziland and made claims to land
as far as the coast.

However, in 18*9 the Ubombo range

was settled upon by Portugal and Transvaal as the
boundary between the latter republic and Portuguese East
Africa.

Although the Swazis were not party to these

arrangements affecting their territory, they traditionally
recognised Swaziland's eastern limits as being closer to
the coast than are the Ubombo mountains(Matsebula,1972).

Acting as arbitrator over the contest between
Portugal and Britain for possession of Delagoa Bay,
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Marshall MacMahon of France defined the northern border
of the Tongaland block on 28 t h March, 1875 (Matsebula,1972).
One of the ramifications of this decision was that the
Tonga tribe, who occupy a corridor of land stretching
along the coast between Delagoa Bay and Lake Sibayi, had
their historical territory dissected.

The Tongas were

at no time involved in the altercation which spawned
the 'MacMahon Award'.

Sambaneland, the part of the Tongaland blockto the west of the Pongola river, was annexed by
Britain in 1#95 and added to Zululand (Union of South
Africa,1955).

Tongaland, east of the river, was

declared a British protectorate in 189* and annexed
by Britain and added to Zululand in 1897 (Union of
South Africa,1955).

If the most recent KwaZulu borders are assumed
ar, immutable (as well they might be while the National
Party remains in power), and should KwaZulu opt for
'independence', the experiences of other African states
with undemocratic border delimitation, irridentism,
and resultant conflict become portentuous for the
citizenry-elect of KwaZulu and to the populace of
adjacent states.
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Moreover, the 1936 Act, by which token the National
Party partitions and allocates land, stipulates the
precise areal size of the 'homelands'. From this perspective, consolidation of the Tongaland block means
that territory more appropriately related to the historical
Zulu domain has been relinquished to white control.
Of course, the pressures on government by white agriculture to place the Josini dam and Makatini flats in
a part of KwaZulu (or, to fit a part of KwaZulu around
these) should not be discounted.

The implications of this legacy are numerous and
whatever the economic potential of the Tongaland block,
its design needs to be viewed within the broader context of apartheid: a trade-off situation exists whereby government attempts to appease protestations by
white capital and by blacks (within the constraints of
an obsolete Act), and to maintain social, economic, and
political dominance.

The Tongaland block appears to

partially satisfy this form of equilibrium while also
conveniently providing a buffer zone in Southern African
political space.

5.6 Summary
Economic, political, and social dimensions of
the consolidation proposals and their implementation
were encountered in this chapter.

They indicated an
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accentuation of disparity in Natal related to core
ideologies and the two case studies signal a continuing
state of dependence by blacks upon the local and international capitalist political economy, whether KwaZulu
becomes 'independent' or not.

In the next, final chapter of the dissertation,
the above conclusions and those from earlier chapters
are elaborated.
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CHAPTER SIX
SYNTHESIS

6.1 Introduction
In this final chapter the salient findings of
the research project are presented as a synthetical
rather than a conclusive set of statements.

Firstly,

the internal colonialism model is briefly recapitulated (6.2)
and then various significant relationships are drawn.
State and capital are associated with labour (6.3), and
with territory (6.4).

Land and labour are then con-

nected (6.5) and the question of territoriality and
the South African internal colony is addressed (6.6).
Some speculative scenarios of the future place of
KwaZulu in the structure of development and underdevelopment are sketched (6.7) before a final statement is made
concerning the spatial impact of state and capital in
South Africa

{^.^).

6.2 The Nature of Internal Colonialism
Postulated in the model of internal colonialism
is a structure of intra-national relationships consequent
upon certain recognisable socio-economic forms. Essentially, the internal colony is a societal group which
is subservient to another group which has control
over power and authority within a given state, and the
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dichotomy between the two is manifest in the division of
labour which favours the polarisation of capital among
the dominant group.

There is a tendency toward a

spatial concentration of the political and eccnonic core
group, just as there is for the peripheral group, the
internal colonv.

The internal colony may carry the

additional feature of a distinctive production pattern
which is inferior in capacity and output to that of
the wider state economy; a distinction exacerbated by
the continuing flow of capital into the core regions
of the space economy in general, and the core societal
group in particular.

Finally, the internal colonialism

model predicts a confrontation between the internal
colony and the superordinate group with the internal
colony seeking independence from the rest of the country.

6.3 State, Capital, and Labour
In South Africa, the relationship between
state and capital revolves about labour, and this on a
racial basis.

When the first vestiges of capitalist forms
appeared in Natal, after British occupation, state and
capital were indistinguishable in terms of their
positions vis-a-vis black labour.

After all, white

capitalists, either agriculturalists or merchant landowners, were personally involved in government.

Blacks
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resident in the reserves comprised a potential labour
pool for urban development while blacks endowed with
the status of tenant or squatter provided a ready source
of monetary or material income to white land-owners.
Unable to enlist sufficient and willing local black
manual labour for an emergent plantation economy,
capitalists found an cutlet in government's readiness
to import indentured Indian labourers into the colony.

Because the implementation of apartheid has
required stringent control over the location of employment for blacks, capital has not always responded
favourably in collusion with anartheid.

Apartheid's

ideologues have of necessity then enacted legislation
to direct capital into specified areas.

Capitalists

have, as shown by their actions, been unenthusiastic
about anartheid's regional policies, but only in so
far as the laws of segregation affect the extraction
of surplus value from production based on black labour.
The success of apartheid is deciscively substantiated
by a capitalist mode of production and government is
prepared to seek strategies of political and economic
decentralisation which accord with the demands for
capital accumulation in the South African and broader
economic structure of capitalist economy..

Pressure is

thus being brought to bear on government to adapt

127

segregationist policies to the structure of capitalism.

Exploitative relationships between capital and
labour are abetted by apartheid.

Capitalism in local

and international settings thrives on a ready supply of
cheap labour and in South Africa this situation arises
directly out of apartheid legislation.

Colonial and

post-colonial government in Natal exhibited a compliance
with nascent and developing capitalism by tolerating
a racial division of labour favouring the accumulation
of capital among whites.

Apartheid government has made

concrete these earlier relationships by legislating for
a racial and spatial division of labour.

It would appear that the continuing subjugation
of black labour is accentuated by the nature of rights
to territory accorded blacks by the state and associated
with capitalist penetration of Natal and Zululand
during the period of colonialism.

6.4 State. Capital, and Land
In pursuance of ideologies at the core, government is faced with the dilemma of maintaining and
increasing economic growth on the one hand, and
territorially removing blacks from the urban cores and
primary agricultural areas on the other hand.

Economic
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growth is sustained largely by white-owned enterprise
utilising black labour, and, given a capitalist mode
of production, the loci of economic growth correspond
with the areas of most intense capital concentration.

KwaZulu is constellated about Natal*s most
economically productive urban and rural zones. The
precedents of this arrangement are tied with the manner
in which capitalism was infused into Natal.

Initial

settlement of Natal by trekkers and Britons involved
the superimposition of private land-ownership over the
pre-colonial organisation of territory.

Reserves

were set apart as a protective device to ensure partial
sanctuary for indigenous blacks in Natal Colony.
Under pressure from whites, government sanctioned the
penetration of Zululand by capitalist interests.

In

this instance, reserves were demarcated in direct
response to white agricultural interests which assisted
in the establishment of the sugar industry in Natal
(which by then embraced Zululand).

More recent developments at the hand of the
apartheid government have included attempts to compact
the original reserves to afford a basis for the
envisaged nation state of KwaZulu.

Proposals for

KwaZulu*s partial consolidation have by and large
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reflected an alignment of governmental decisions with
the interests of capitalist development in the agricultural and industrial sectors.

Borders have been

delimited to provide maximum possible accessibility
by blacks in KwaZulu to the industrial centres in Natal.
Inter-urban transportation routes follow distinct corridors which fragment KwaZulu.

Where certain strategic

resources and planned ireas of urban-industrial development have in the past fallen in a reserve, these have
now been excluded from KwaZulu.

*.5 Land and Labour
Black labour in Natal is dispersed throughout the
province, within and without KwaZulu.

Ideally, in

terms of apartheid ideology, all blacks would ultimately
be resident in KwaZulu, and would sell their labour in
the white-owned areas.

Blacks within KwaZulu practice

limited agriculture in the main, and their labour there
makes little contribution to capital accumulation in
South Africa.

Blacks working outside KwaZulu provide

the bulk of Natal's workforce, and predominantly as
manual labourers. The latter group of blacks have
almost no prospect, under the current regime, of
acquiring status as permanent residents at or rear
their place of work, and official policy would have
them reside within KwaZulu.
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Rural blacks outside KwaZulu fall into three
broad categories : those in reserves of the past now
deproclaimed as parts of KwaZulu; those employed on
white farms; and tenants on white farms.

The first and

last groups face removal and resettlement within KwaZulu and members of the other group are considered
only as temporary workers on white farms.

Blacks to

be resettled are victims of the superimposition of
a pattern of land-ownership based on monetary values over
the pre-colonial landscape.

Besides giving rise to the pattern of landownership which pressures blacks into territory reserved
for them by whites, the penetration of capitalism into
Natal has precipitated two 'circuits of production'
within the province.

Although both circuits are

married into the capitalist mode of production, the
lower circuit is confined to KwaZulu and represents
an inferior sector of the economy as far as the generation
of capital is concerned (cf Santos,1973).

For Sachs(197*),

the lower circuit (which he writes of as 'the traditional
sector') is, '...in extreme cases' (Sachs,197*:139), in
fact an internal colony.

6.6 Internal Colonialism and Territory
The division of labour on a racial basis is
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regarded as the fundamental source for internal colonialism, and the internal colonialism model adequ°tely
defines the relationship between blacks in Natal and the
white-controlled political economy.

In Natal, all blacks are considered in this study
to constitute an internal colony, but this clearly on
a provincial basis.

Of course, all blacks in South

Africa would, in terms of the approach and findings
of this study, be an internal colony and Natal serves
only RS an exemplar.

In South Africa the internal colony is dispersed
throughout the country and therefore territorially
almost indistinguishable from the core conscious collective. The objectives of government in this regard are
to furnish the internal colony with a territorial base
and thereafter to 'decolorise' that territory.

The successful assertion of the internal colony's
collective crrsciousness by seeking to divorce itself
from the superordinate group, as predicted by the internal
colonialism model, would require in South Africa a
change in socio-economic structures of dependence rather
than a territorial separation.

The 'homelands' do net

meet the territorial demands of blacks and are merely
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creations of the core group.

6.7 Speculative Scenarios
It is significant, as a form cf evaluation of
the internal colonialism model, to extrapolate from
the research findings and theoretical considerations
and to pose speculations about possible outcomes of
the current phase of internal colonialism in South
Africa.

Two scenarios are presented below and these

on the assumption of a continuing white oligarchy in
South Africa.

l)KwaZulu remains territorially fragmented and is
accorded political independence from South Africa in
terms of apartheid policy.
Should this eventuate, Zulus would retain their
identity as an internal colony.

The KwaZulu economy

would remain dependent upon the embracing South African
economy for at least two reasons.

Firstly, migrant

labour in the urban-industrial cores and white farms
would still provide the major source of revenue for
KwaZulu.

Secondly, the fragmented nature of KwaZulu

implies dependency on South Africa for the exercising
of political rights in KwaZulu, as well as dependency
in terms of trade and communications outside of South
Africa.

The consolidation proposals do not pretend

to be aimed at absolute consolidation and for this reason
there is little possibility for the elimination of
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internal colonial structures under South Africa's
government of today.

A fragmented KwaZulu compells

the Zulu people to remain bound into the South African
political economy.

2)KwaZulu is consolidated as a single area and is
accorded political independence in terms of apartheid
policy.
In this case, two possible outcomes are postulated.
a) If the KwaZulu authorities ont for an economic
system polemically opposed to that functioning in
South Africa today, it would be necessary for KwaZulu
to divorce itself from the South African political
economy to obviate dependence.

This would, perforce,

involve the retraction of KwaZulu citizens from their
places cf work in South Africa.

The magnitude of

this task and the probable refusal on the part cf the
workers involved (and South Africa would be reluctant
to encourage their departure) to carry it out would
present one problem, while the capacity for KwaZulu
to absorb them into its economy at once would be another.
Should the unlikely task be attempted over a long
period of time, blacks in Natal would remain an
internal colony until the completion of the task, and
even then underdevelopment may persist for other reasons,
such a- P transformation of dependence from a local to
an international structure.
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b)If KwaZulu remained within the

capitalist structure,

KwaZulu would remain dependent on South Africa and the
international capitalist system, just as many excolonies have done (cf Crush,1977 for the case of
Swaziland).

Furthermore, this outcome would bring to

the surface cleavages among blacks within KwaZulu
in terms of relative access to capital and for some
of the main reasons why blacks today are an internal
colony in South Africa.

In both of the above instances it wculd appear
that there is little probability of blacks freeing
themselves from internal colonialism while the current
South African political economy is sustained and
while an assymmetrical interdependence between the
internal colony and the core exists.

This observation

leads to the suggestion that the period of black internal
colonialism in South Africa can only end with a changed
relationship between labour with state and capital.
This outcome lies outside the notion of 'homeland'
development.

6.8 Conclusion
Internal colonialism in South Africa, as
exemplified in this study of KwaZulu in Natal, is a
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function of the combined interests of state and of
capital.

Efforts by the state at confining the internal
colony within specific territorial limits does not
exempt the internal colony from subservience to or
dependence upon the core and upon international
economic structures.

The solution to the problem of internal colonialism lies not in the relationship between land and
labour on the terms of coital and state, but in the
termination of the existing conditions of the
relationship of labour with capital and state.

Only

then will the problem of territorial rights be able
to be dealt with effectively in South Africa.
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NOTES

PREFACE
1.

Ideology is defined in Chapter One (1.4).
Discriminate classes are recognised in South African
society by an expanding social scientific literature,
although consensus on the issues of isolating
classes and explaining their structures of interrelationship are uncommon in that literature
(Trapido,1971; Davies,1973; Kuner,1974; Mhlongo,
1975; Fair and Davies,1976; Johnstone,197*;
WoIpe,197*; Smith,1977).

2.

Estimates made by the South African Institute of
Race Relations, 197* yearbook.

3.

This new term followed the 1955 report of the
Tomlinson Commission.

4.

Apartheid is the Afrikaans term for 'apartness' and
it is now attached to the segregationist policy cf
f-e ruling National Party,

CHAPTER ONE
1.

cf Thompson (I960).

2.

The term applied to farms bought by blacks in
colonial Natal, outside the reserves. They remain
as small fragments cf black territory outside the
'homelands'.

3.

The de .jure figure would refer to all blacks
classified by government as Zulu, that is all
blacks considered by government as citizens of
KwaZulu whether they live there or not.

4.

The University of Natal (Durban) and Don Africana
libraries provided most of the data sought. The latter
is contained within the Durban Municipal Library
and is a valuable source of historical material on
Natal, after the Killie Campbell Library in Durban.
The South African Institute of Race Relations
Library in Durban is small but contains some interesting
material on recent history.

CHAPTER W O
1.

Other recent geographical works of interest are
the papers by Ginsburg(1973) and Slater(1975)
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CHAPTER THREE
1.

Descendents of the Dutch who settled at the Cape
of Good Hope after 1652 and who in the nineteenth
century left the south western Cape to escape
British colonial administration.

2.

The Voortrekker government in Natalia Republic.

3.

This area corresponds roughl}'- with the Alfred
magisterial district and the portion of the
Port Shepstone district separating Alfred from the
coast (Map No. 3 ) .

4.

Fynn, the resident magistrate of Msir.ga district,
in 1894 commented on conditions in one reserve
under his jurisdiction : 'More than half this
surface is mountainous and rocky and cannot be
cultivated. Water is also scarce, and in dry
seasons great distances have to be travelled
to fetch water by the Natives, and the stock
have to be driven many miles to drink' (Colony
of Natal,1^94:53).

5.

See Union of South Africa,191* (2): *33-*3*.

*.

The Natal Native Trust held the Deeds of Grant to
the reserves in Natal during British colonial rule.
The white trustees were required to '...grant, sell,
lease or otherwise dispose of the land, in such
ways as they see fit, for the support, advantage
of well-being of the said Natives, or for purposes
connected therewith' (Union of South Africa,1955).
The Zululand Native Trust took on the same responsibilities and both trusts were put in the charge
of the Minister of Native Affairs after Union.

7.

The report of the Natal Lands Commission of 1902
contained the recommendation that '...in the case
of rural lands, the essential of beneficial occupation is that a man of European descent should have
his home on the land, and be bona fide endeavouring
to make his living thereon. Any owner, of any colour
or nationality, already registered, will, however,
have to be regarded as capable of fulfilling
occupation conditions on his own land' (Colony of
Natal,1902:12).

8.

Border areas are the officially recognised zones
adjacent to homelands which satsfy the requirements
for industrial decentralisation policy and which
qualify industrialists locating plants there to
obtain certain stipulated incentive grants.
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9.

Because KwaZulu delayed its acceptance of the
Legas"1 rtive Assembly status for its Territorial
Authority, KwaZulu had an Executive Committee
headed by a Chief Executive Officer.
If a new Bill to amend the Eantu Homelands Constitution Act is passed, 'homelands' will be able
to achieve the status of 'internally autonomous
countries'(South African Digest.8.4.1977).

10.

cf Marks(1970) on the 1906 black rebellion over
poll tax.

11.

It is interesting to not« that -Seme was the Swaziland
national attorney who was instructing lawyer for th»
Swazi delegation which went to London in 1922
over the question of land partitioning in that country
(Matsebula,1972).

12.

This applies to the releasing of land from the
conditions of the 1913 Act for purchase by the
Native Trusts.

13.

A term widely used to denote non-'homeland' territory
in South Africa; that is 'white' South Africa.

CHAPTER FIVE
1.

The ideology of the trans-national corporation is
concisely stated in a booklet by the chairman of
Unilever Limited (Unilever,1976 Unilever and economic
development in the third vorld,Unilever;London).

2.

Maasdorp(1975 ** suggests that the figure could be
as high as a quarter million for illegal blacks
in Durban while as many as 300,000 blacks in the
metropolitan area could be shack dwellers.

3.

British financial houses participated in the
accumulation of finance capital for the plant.
The plant was planned when phosphoric acid prices
were high. With a fall in the price, the French
Gazocean corporation pulled out of the scheme (Economist,
9.3.1977).

4.

The minerals to be extracted from the mine before
1980, it is anticipated, will be rutile(56,000tons),
zircon(115,000tons), titania slag(399,OOCtons), and
low manganese pig iron(217,00^tons) (Financial Mail.
30.7.1976).
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APPENDIX A

1. Map of 'Multistant proposed by Malherbe(1974)
and Viljoen(1976) - see p.99

2. Map showing resettlement villages in Natal.
Taken from Desmond(1971) - see p.105

3. Map showing Tonga territory.

Taken from

Junod(1962) - see p.121

4. Map of Tongaland 188^. Taken from Matsebula(1972) see p.122

5. Map showing selected Natal place-names
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APPENDIX B

Comments on land consolidation by the Executive
Council of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly,
Pl.7.197?
-J y I J 4 •

(Tabled at a special session in January
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COMMENTS ON LAND CONSOLIDATION BY THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF THE
KWAZULU LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY : FRIDAY 21ST JULY, 1972.
TO THE HONOURABLE THE COMMISSIONER-GENERAL, MR. P.H. TORLAGE,
COMMISSIONER-GENERAL FOR THE ZULU AND SWAZI NATIONAL UNITS.
1.

When we met the Honourable the Prime Minister on the 28th

June, 1971, in the Hon. the Commissioner-General's presence, the
Chief Executive Councillor speaking on behalf of the Executive
Council, made it clear to the Hon. the Prime Minister,
Mr

- B.J. Vorster, that Consolidation of land in KwaZulu on the

basis of the 1936 Native Land and Trust Act would, if pursued,
Place us as Leaders of our people in an invidious position.

He

explained that the quota promised by the Hertzog Government in
1936, was promised as additional land to existing Native Reserves
long before present policies which envisage the setting up of
Separate States were ever contemplated.

The Chief Executive

Councillor expressed the feelings of the Executive Council and of the
majority of the Zulu people when he said that the 1936 land quota cannot
be accepted as adequate to set up a Separate Country with any possibility
of viability.

In other words we cannot be convinced that the Republican

Government seriously wants to set us up as a Country, if it can only do
so on the basis of the 1936 quota promised by the Hertzog Government.
2.

The plan for consolidation as presented to us by Mr. Peppier on

behalf of the Hon. the Minister, on the 2nd June, 1972, we find it difficult
to accept, in view of the above views clearly expressed to the Hon. the
Prime Minister in the presence of both the Hon. the Minister of Bantu
Administration and Development and Education, Mr. M.C. Botha, and the
Commissioner-General for the Zulu and Swazi National Units, Mr. P.H. Torlage.
That is if we have any say in the matter.

It is unacceptable on moral grounds

as we can hardly accept that what was promised by General Hertzog before
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Separate Development was ever expounded as a policy, is good enough to
cover up for any failure to face up to the implications of seriously
setting up KwaZulu as a Country.
3.

The Zulu people just like other Black people in the Republic still

expect to get the quota promised under the 1936 Land and Trust Act. They
can, however, hardly be expected to correlate the fulfillment of those
promises by the Hertzog Government in 1936 to the consolidation of KwaZulu
in terms of the present Government's policy under a completely new committment
of the Country under present policies.
4.

The use of State lands for consolidation seems to be an attempt to

placate White voters by touching as little of their land as possible. We
have never doubted in our minds that State lands would automatically fall
into KwaZulu.

It hardly seems fair that hectares from State lands should

be counted by the Government for the purposes of fulfilling promises under
the 1936 Land Act or for consolidation under the policy of Separate Development.

This we state in view of the amount of land that is already owned by

the White minority in this Country and the little percentage that falls
under our areas.
5.

The idea of splitting up land under irrigation near Jozini Dam between

Whites and us left us completely flabbergasted at what appears to us to be
White avarice gone mad.

Whites are already so wealthy in South Africa that

we would have thought that it would hardly dent White wealth to give all the
lands under irrigation at Jozini to the Zulu people. We did not expect
Ubombo and neighbouring areas to be made White merely for the purposes of
sharing the Jozini Dam Scheme with us, who are starting almost from scratch.
6.

The Game Reserves are an integral part of KwaZulu and just like

State lands we thought they would automatically fall into KwaZulu where they
belong.

We were shocked to find them split up between Whites (Hluhluwe)
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and Blacks (Mfolozi), as they are one complex.

Since we have no

industries we thought reserves could contribute towards the alleviation of
our poverty as a Tourist attraction. We see examples of the great possibilities
in this respect in the free African Countries like Kenya, Tanzania and
Zambia. It seems more reasonable to keep Game Reserves as one complex and
to give them to us as such, instead of destroying them by splitting up
the complex.
7.

If the Republican Government seriously wanted KwaZulu to be a

viable State, then Richards Bay should be our port so that we can get
an outlet to the sea and also give us a possibility of getting anywhere near
economic viability.

We are shocked at the idea of giving all the Coast

to Whites and leaving us with hardly any beaches. This is more serious
as it underlies White mistrust of Blacks to the extent of deliberately
making them land-locked.

If we are mistrusted in this way, what reason do

we have to trust those who display such a mistrust of us?
8.

The scheme involves the removal of too many of our people and

very few Whites comparatively speaking.

This even involves the removal

of people who have fairly recently been removed to places like Paulpietersburg.
9.

The idea of taking away places like Groutville, Ifafa and others, which

have developed sugar cane farming, seemed grossly inconsiderate in terms
of our general underdevelopment as a people. How can our most developed
farming land be taken away and given to Whites who already have so much?
10.
Stanger is to Zulus a National shrine as it is the resting place
of King Shaka, the founder of the Zulu Nation. The Afrikaners have their
own sacred places and this is our most sacred ground and one would have
expected more sympathy from them in this regard.
11.

The whole idea of having corridors of White territories cutting us

apart, does not convince us that the Government wants to consolidate
seriously.
12.

This position we find completely unacceptable.

We find it almost ludicrous if it was not so tragic, that all rich

places that fall logically within a consolidation plan for KwaZulu from
our point of view should not have fallen within KwaZulu to enable those
Whites who wish to keep their land and fall under KwaZulu to do so. This
is not such a horrible idea. We know many dedicated Nationalists who own
land in Swaziland and Botswana, and who have not turned Black or changed
their Citizenship except that they must abide by the laws of those Countries.
13.

Even at draft-level, we wish we had been involved as a people

most affected, to help in making proposals, and a joint Commission of both
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Whites and Zulus should have been appointed.
14.

To have an ail-White Commission nominated by an all-White Government

to decide on our future means that it is only the interests of the Whites
which are well safeguarded.

Anyone who contradicts this would only imply

that Whites are Angels and not Humans like us, if they would not be
influenced mainly by the interests of their own people.
15.

As far as we are concerned Separate Development is a political

operation.

It is a political solution for South Africa's problems

Prescribed by the present Government.

Therefore, with all due respect

for considerations as to suitability of land for agriculture and other
industries, all we are concerned with for the purposes of this policy for the
moment, is a political map of KwaZulu, and once we have this, it will be
for us to know what to do once we have a country with clear-cut boundaries.
16.

In view of the foregoing we wish to repeat that the scheme for the

Consolidation of KwaZulu as presented to us at present, is UNACCEPTABLE TO US.
We recommend a Natal and KwaZulu Referendum of people of all races on this
question.
1.

Chief Executive Councillor

2.

Executive Councillor
(Agriculture and Forestry)

3.

Executive Councillor
(Roads and Works)

4.

Executive Councillor
(Community Affairs)

5.

Executive Councillor
(Education and Culture)

6.

Executive Councillor
(Justice)
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NOTION ON CONSOLIDATION
1.

On the 28th June, 1971 the Hon. the Prime Minister told the
Executive Council that the Republican Government would consolidate
the Homelands only to the extent of the quota promised under the
Bantu Trust and Land Act of 1936.

2.

On the 2nd June, 1972 the Hon. the Minister of Bantu Administration
and Development, through his messenger Mr. Pepler, released to
His Majesty the King of the Zulus, the Chief Executive Councillor

3.

and Members of the Executive Council, a Map of the proposed
consolidation of Kwa-Zulu.
On the 21st July, 1972 the Executive Councillors presented their
reactions to the Commissioner General, on the so called proposed
draft map of Kwa-Zulu, in the form of a memorandum.

4.

On the 19th of October, 1972 the Hon. the Minister of Bantu
Administration and Development, met the members of the Executive
Council of Kwa-Zulu in Pretoria, and attempted to hold
discussions on the so called proposed draft map of Kwa-Zulu,
which were not successful.
the

This was on account of the fact that

Executive Council's attitude was as follows:(a)

that the Chief Executive Councillor
speaking on behalf of the Executive Council
on the 28th June, 1971 made it clear to the
Hon. the Prime Minister that consolidation on the
basis of the 1936 Bantu Trust and Land Act, was not
acceptable to the Executive Council as a basis on which
consolidation in terms of the Government Policy of
separate development, should take place.

(b)

that the Executive Council had already expressed its
reaction to the so called draft map of Kwa-Kulu, which
reaction it presented to the Republican Government through
the Hon. the Commissioner General on the 21st July, 1972
in the form of a formal Memorandum.
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(c)

In view of the fact that the so called draft map

of Kwa-Zulu was prepared without any participation of the Zulu
people, and the fact that it was based on the 1936 Bantu Trust
and Land Act, which had nothing to do with the Policy of
Seperate Development, as adumbrated by the Nationalist Government
since 1948, which basis we do not accept, and also in view of
the Hon. the Minister's attitude, which left the Kwa-Zulu
Government without any basis acceptable on both sides,
I move that in the opinion of this House, that whereas
we appreciate the willingness of the present Government to deliver
the full quota of 526 000 morgen promised by the Hertog Government
in 1936, we cannot accept that such delivery of the said quota
is sufficient to set up Kwa-Zulu as a country, that being the
impression the present Government has given not only to us but
to the whole world.
Further in view of the Hon. the Prime Minister's
attitude as set out above, in fixing the 1936 Bantu Trust and Land
Act quota as the only basis for consolidation of Kwa-Zulu,
this House sees no point in creating a false impression that
there is a scope for negotiation, when the Prime Minister's
attitude makes it so clear that we have no such scope.
While we accept that we are powerless like all Black people in
this country, we cannot accept being used to create the
impression that we have scope for negotiation under these
circumstances, when in point of fact, there is none at all.
We therefore wish it known that the proposed
consolidation on the aforesaid basis is unacceptable to this
House, and that we bow to it like all unilateral decrees which
various White minority Government of South Africa have always
imposed on us when ever it suited them without any prior
consultation what so ever.

CHIEF EXECUTIVE COUNCILLOR
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